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tutkittu aikaisemmin. Tästä syystä tutkielmani keskittyy tarkastelemaan kysymystä kuka luottaa 
sijoitusneuvojaan ja miksi. Tutkimus tarjoaa uraauurtavia tuloksia tältä rahoituksen alueelta. 
Sijoitusneuvonta on tärkeä osa pankkien liiketoimintaa, sillä asiakaspalvelijat toimivat 
myyntineuvottelijoina pankkien omille tuotteille. Luottamuksella sijoitusneuvontaan on 
huomattavia vaikutuksia siihen, pitäisikö pankkien ylipäätään investoida neuvontapalveluihin ja 
kuinka suurelta osin pakkeja voidaan pitää vastuussa sijoittajien päätöksistä.  
Data ja metodologia 
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ajatellessa omia pankkiasioita sekä –palveluita, pankkitransaktioiden tekeminen Internetissä sekä 
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mm. suuria eroja tekijöissä maiden välillä.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a lack of research concerning factors affecting trust in investment advisory. Campbell 
(2006) acknowledges the relative ignorance of this area of finance when studying the average 
household behavior and investing. However investment advisory is an important part of banks’ 
operations since banks sell their funds and other investment products via advisors to 
households. The majority of the literature concerning financial advisory concentrates around 
the choices made under the influence of advisors and the outcome of these strategies (Hong, 
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2008; Kaustia, Alho and Puttonen 2008; Mullainathan, Nöth and 
Schoar, 2012, and others). There is a lack of knowledge about the factors having an effect on 
trusting of households using services of investment advisors.  
To be able to determine the relevance of investment advisory we need to know whether 
people trust the advisors or not. This study concentrates around the question of trust and what 
influences that. I’m asking the question who trusts investment advisors and why. This research 
contributes to existing literature a pioneering whole new area of study. Who trusts investment 
advisors has great applications to whether banks should invest in advisory services and to which 
extent advisors can be blamed for the investment decisions of households.  
Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) argue that trust in professional advice only affect the 
market participation of households when perceived own financial capability is low. They 
present evidence that the majority of households expect financial institutions to provide advice. 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) find that Dutch households’ trust in others has statistically 
significant effect on stock market participation. They also suggest that education about the stock 
market can reduce this effect. Intuitively one could argue that the meaning of financial advice 
is to educate households and add to their level of financial literacy as it is in the best interest of 
the banks to have informed customers making rational decisions. Otherwise the bank can end 
up having law suits from customers who didn’t understand the risks involved in products they 
bought. Merton and Bodie (2005) conclude that economic growth is promoted by well-
functioning financial institutions. Selling investment products is a vital source of money for 
banks and therefore financial advisors who act as sales negotiators and close the deals are the 
core of a functioning institution.  
Already Jensen (1968) found that professionally managed funds underperform passive 
investment strategies. Therefore Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) argue that there has to be other 
benefits investors are seeking hiring managers apart from portfolio returns. Gennaioli, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2015) offer explanation suggesting that investors utilizing advisory services are 
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too anxious to invest on their own and therefore are willing to pay high fees for the managers 
to assist in investment decisions. These investors have low level of financial literacy and money 
managers are able to provide them a peace of mind. This leads investors not to consider the fees 
as costs. The authors even argue that these investors earn higher expected returns by using 
financial advisory than they would investing on their own.  
This research assumes that utilizing investment advisory costs the customer. These costs 
do not occur directly but in the form of fees on funds and other investment products advisors 
sell. As the banks have to cover their costs such as advisors salary, they have to charge fees 
from customers investing in funds and other products. Funds normally have an entry charge, an 
exit charge and an ongoing charge. Even if the investor would only buy stocks it usually costs 
more when the transaction is made by an advisor and not online. Also the book-entry account 
which holds the stocks costs the investor. Investment advisors recommend banks’ own products 
to keep the money in the bank and to gain profits from the customer. Passive investment 
strategies are rarely available as they don’t profit the bank. Therefore to invest passively as 
Jensen (1968) suggests investor has to have a high level of financial literacy to discover the 
possibilities himself.  
Goldstein, Johnson and Sharpe (2008) discuss about the difficulty retail investors face 
while having to choose between different investment funds and products, the total amount 
invested and the allocation between the investments. In this light it seems natural that some 
investors turn to financial advisors for help. Kaustia, Lehtoranta and Puttonen (2015) find 
evidence that financial advisors’ sophistication is linked to excessive optimism as an 
unconscious bias. They show that when the sophistication of an advisor decreases the expected 
stock market return increases. Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find that German retail customers are 
most unwilling to obtain financial advice when they most need it. They discover that even those 
who do obtain the advice are unlikely to follow it. Therefore they argue that financial advisory 
is needed and necessary but is unlikely to reach those who most need it. 
This study relates to several areas of research. Already Knack and Keefer (1997) have 
studied the role of trust in the context of social capital. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) 
have pursued similar research in the field of finance finding the effect of trust on financial 
development and market participation. A resent finding by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) 
suggest that managers performing worst are charging the highest fees. This could explain in 
one part why retail investors are suspicious about the advice given to them and not obtaining 
such advice even when they have a low level of financial literacy. This study relates to 
household finance which studies households’ behavior. Campbell (2006) argues that the 
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behavior is difficult to measure adequately as textbook models can’t capture the entity of 
constrains households face such as constraints on borrowing.  
There has been discussion in the media lately about the most trusted professions. A 
Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (2014) reported results of Reader’s Digest European 
Trusted Brands 2014 survey to list financial advisor as third most untrusted profession in 
Finland. In the light of these discussions and academic lack of research on this area my study 
brings groundbreaking knowledge about the facts concerning investors trust in financial 
advisors.  
I find that men trust on average less likely in investment advisors than women and that 
there are significant country differences in probabilities of trusting. Southern Europeans trust 
less likely in investment advisory than North Europeans. A number of factors are identified to 
affect trust such as difficulties related to understanding information given and feeling depressed 
when thinking about finances and financial services. Some financial priorities affect the 
probability to trust. For example saving for retirement as a priority increases the likelihood of 
trusting advisory. People who have made bank transaction over the Internet are less likely to 
trust in investment advisors as are those willing to invest abroad. Banks’ aggressive marketing 
is found to affect trustworthiness negatively. The feeling that bank transactions are secure and 
that personal information is kept adequately protected increases the likelihood of trusting 
investment advisory. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the previous literature concerning 
the topic and some background information. Section 3 introduces the research question and 
hypotheses of this research. Section 4 presents the data and methods and section 5 reveals the 
results of independent logistic regression models. Section 6 discusses the elimination of 
irrelevant factors and section 7 presents the final model explaining trust. Subsample analysis is 
provided in Section 8. Section 9 discusses implications and makes suggestion for further study. 
Section 10 concludes the study.  
2. Previous literature and background 
This section discusses the most relevant previous literature covering financial advisory. 
As already stated there is no previous research discussing types of people trusting financial 
advisors or covering the factors possibly influencing this trust. However there are few papers 
closely related to this discussion and they are presented here. Also some background on 
investment advisors and legislation regulating their work is provided.  
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2.1. Discussion on previous literature 
Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) pursue different ways of modeling investor trust 
in money managers. They assume in their model that investor is unable to take risk on his own 
and any investment made would require a manager’s help. Their argument is that investor’s 
subjective perception of risk to investing decreases when trust to the manager increases. Their 
conclusion is that these trusted managers are able to charge higher fees from investors since 
these investors prefer to use services of those managers they trusts the most. The authors argue 
that investors are taking on more risk with the trusted managers and therefore gaining higher 
expected returns. The model of Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny assumes that these money 
managers have strong incentives to pander investors’ beliefs in the hopes of extracting higher 
fees. Therefore their argument is that money managers are in this only to gain fees from 
customers which is rather narrow view in my opinion. If managers would only extract as high 
fees as possible wouldn’t the investors eventually seek for more profitable opportunities? The 
model is merely theoretical since the authors lack empirical data of real investors and managers. 
Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) are close to the subject of trust in financial advice but 
their viewpoint is rather different from this research. They are interested whether household 
actually utilize the advice they are given by financial institutions. They find that this is 
dependent on their own financial capability and trust in the advice. They state that trust in 
financial advice has statistically significant effect on stock market participation but only for 
households with low financial capability. Their research is discussing how trust affects 
households decisions to use financial advice while this study in concentrated around the notion 
of what drives trust in investment advisors. Hence the research of Georgarakos and Inderst has 
the closest relation to this paper and holds the most relevant findings.  
A research from Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) studies the effect that a lack of trust 
has on stock market participation using Dutch and Italian micro data. However they define trust 
as individuals attribute to possibility of being cheated. This refers mostly to quality of investor 
protection which can be argued to play diminishing role in investing to developed economies 
such as Scandinavian market. Simulations of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales suggest that lack of 
trust in stock market can explain why some wealthy people decide not to participate in the 
market in the United States. A related paper by Suleyman, and Cuoco (1998) studies a market 
where a fraction of population isn’t investing due to frictions such as costs of information.  
A research by Berk and Green (2004) study active portfolio management when 
managerial talent is a scarce resource. They find a strong correlation between past performance 
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and the flow of funds. Arguably it is easier for the investment advisors to recommend funds 
with superior past performance which would lead to cash flowing to these funds. Carlin (2009) 
shows that anomalies in pricing of financial products arise when firms add complexity to their 
pricing structures. He argues that consumers are prevented from becoming knowledgeable 
about prices in the market by adding complexity to pricing of the products. When the pricing is 
beyond understanding of customers one could argue that they become more careful in their 
decisions and need more time to consider choices. This would reflect to financial advisors since 
they are facing a challenge of closing a deal quickly. Kaustia, Laukkanen and Puttonen (2009) 
find that question framing has a significant impact on the advice financial professionals give. 
Depending on what the client asks the advice varies. Question about required returns results in 
different outcome than asking about expected returns. Kaustia, Laukkanen and Puttonen argue 
that these variations subject the advisors to behavioral biases leading to investment mistakes. 
Therefore advisors should strive towards giving consistent advice. 
Interestingly Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find younger mutual fund managers to be more 
conventional in their portfolio choices and therefore hold less unsystematic risk. Financial 
advisors could profit from recommending these less risky portfolios to customers not willing to 
bear much risk and gaining their trust this way. French (2008) suggest that financial institutions 
deliberately fail to correct the misunderstanding of active versus passive investment strategy 
returns. He notes that illusion of active investing being easy and profitable is promoted also by 
the press. 
2.2. Background 
In theory there is just one market portfolio holding all possible assets and an investor just 
chooses how much risk he is willing to bear or how much return he expects and moves on the 
capital market line by leveraging or deleveraging this portfolio (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 
1994). However as there is no market portfolio available and the risk-free rate varies between 
investors this kind of investing is not reality. In fact when an average retail investor enters a 
bank to visit a financial advisor he most certainly isn’t advised to invest in one single portfolio 
of assets but there will be a number of funds and structured products available instead. As 
Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) suggest it is not in the interest of banks to advise people 
to invest in passive strategies.  
When a new investor enters a bank to visit a financial advisor there is a strict protocol to 
follow. Since EU set the MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) advisors are 
bound by law to fill out an investor profile which specifies at least financial situation, 
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investment horizon, risk preferences and activeness of the investor. This directive was set to 
eliminate poor advice which was brought up especially during the financial crisis of 2008. The 
idea was that when advisors hold knowledge about the entire financial situation of the clients 
and not just about the finances in one bank they would not advise already leveraged customers 
to take on more risk. Knowing more about the investor would improve the quality of advice 
and result in smaller losses. Financial advisors are bound by law to reassure that customer 
understands what he is buying, the risks and the costs related. All this regulation should result 
in more trustworthy advice and therefore more trust in financial advisors.  
If the customer has a good financial situation, moderate risk preferences and he doesn’t 
follow the market actively it is likely that the financial advisor recommends a fund of funds 
since they are considered to be easiest to manage for customers with low level of financial 
literacy and they are well diversified across industries and countries. Also they bring the best 
income for financial institutions. These are easy to understand and customers lacking 
knowledge are rarely interested about the precise contents of the fund. Fund of funds is a fund 
that invests in the banks own funds and therefore has maximal diversification and fees. Since 
fund of funds is often “managing itself” in the eyes of the customer it doesn’t require reacting 
even if there is a crisis somewhere. The fund manager will take care of diversification and 
allocation of funds. Therefore these funds are popular despite of the costs. Also as Gennaioli, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2015) argue these sort of possibilities provide the investors a peace of 
mind.  
3. Research question and hypotheses 
The purpose of this study is to examine factors that could affect the probability of people 
trusting investment advisors. This study aims to conclude a set of variables which have a 
statistically significant effect on the probability. Therefore the research questions of this study 
is defined as follows: 
What factors affect the probability of trusting investment advisors?  
Due to the amount of variables used in this study there are a large number of hypotheses. 
Therefore the hypotheses are presented in Table 1. I will only describe in more detail the 
rationale for the less intuitive hypotheses to avoid repetition and explaining the obvious.  My 
hypothesis is that people trust in investment advisors in general but there could be 
differentiations between for example age groups. Intuitively I would argue that younger people 
trust advisory more likely than elderly since they are more insecure about their financial 
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knowledge and have no previous experience investing. Elderly people already have certain 
perception about markets and they have probably experienced losses as well. However previous 
studies don’t support this intuition. Sutter and Kocher (2007) find that trust in experimental 
trust games increases from early childhood to early adulthood but after that stays constant. 
Therefore their study finds no support on trust differentiations between different adult age 
groups. Robinson and Jackson (2001) discover that trust in others is lowest among youngest 
Americans and increases until middle-age but then levels off. In the light of the previous studies 
my first hypothesis is that age doesn’t have an effect on the probability of trusting investment 
advisors. This hypothesis is the first one in Table 1. 
The second hypothesis in Table 1 is that men trust investment advisors less likely than 
women. This hypothesis is based on previous studies (Lundeberg, Fox and Puncochar, 1994; 
Prince, 1993; Barsky et al., 1997; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009 etc.) 
which find men for example more overconfident and taking more risk than women. This results 
men feeling more competent making financial decisions by themselves and trusting their own 
opinions more than investment advisors’. Third hypothesis is that marital status shouldn’t have 
an effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. This is based on the assumption 
that marital status shouldn’t have an effect on one’s beliefs. 
It is hard to argue which financial priorities would have an effect on the probability of 
trusting investment advisors. For example people saving for retirement probably should hear 
some advice on long term investments from advisors but on the other hand they are a large 
group of different kind of people with different backgrounds. Therefore these people are in 
different levels of financial literacy and probably therefore also trust financial advisors 
differently. There are conflicting arguments that financial priorities could have a positive or a 
negative effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors hence Table 1 concludes 
hypotheses of no effect for these variables.  
Hypotheses 15 to 21 in Table 1 state that respondent’s sentiment towards his own finances 
and financial services has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of trusting 
investment advisors. The hypothesis is that positive feelings result in trusting more likely and 
negative feelings result in trusting less likely in advisors. This assumption is an extension from 
studies finding a connection between sentiment and stock returns (Baker and Wurgler, 2006 
etc.). When sentiment is high investors rush to the market and the stock returns of particular 
stocks decrease. Investors “trust” the market as the sentiment is high and therefore I argue that 
this phenomenon is visible also in other context with investment advisors. For example people 
finding thinking about their finances and financial services interesting are more prone to 
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accepting advice from investment advisors as the sentiment generally is positive. People finding 
thinking about their finances depressing have probably encountered losses previously and their 
trust is shattered. Therefore it is hard for the investment advisor to convince that the next 
product wouldn’t realize the risk. Those having negative feelings are more cautious taking the 
advice and therefore less likely to trust than those having positive feelings. 
22nd hypothesis in Table 1 suggests that people who own stocks have higher level of 
financial literacy as they have monitored the market in hopes of returns on their stocks. I would 
expect people who find following the market enjoyable to use more their own judgment on 
making decisions and trust less likely in investment advisors than those who are ignorant about 
the market and not investing in stocks. Also I would argue that more educated people especially 
those with business education would trust less likely in investment advisors since they would 
know how limited is the educational background of advisors in general. They would also hold 
more knowledge about the theories supporting passive investing and the weakness of mutual 
funds. These people are therefore more likely to invest directly in stocks than buying expensive 
products from advisors. The same rationale goes for the 26. hypothesis in Table 1 assuming 
that people who could consider investing abroad trust less likely in investment advisors. 
Assumption is that these investors have a high level of financial literacy.  
Table 1 indicates in the 23. hypothesis that people having a mortgage loan trust more 
likely in investment advisors than those not having one. This hypothesis is based on the notion 
that those having a mortgage loan are young adults with not yet enough money to pay off their 
debt. They are busy with their careers and families and therefore they have no time to follow 
the market. Hence they are more willing to accept the investment advisors easy solutions where 
they don’t have to spend their time monitoring their investments or following market 
movements closely. 
People who have used the Internet to make bank transactions are probably familiar with 
using the Internet services of banks and therefore able to obtain information from banks, their 
products and costs. Hence they have a greater access to information for comparing different 
options than those not using the Internet. Therefore these Internet users are more likely to be 
aware of the costs related to obtaining products investment advisors sell and also more cautious 
trusting their biased advice. Internet users are also able to gain more knowledge on finance 
theory over the Internet and thus gain higher level of financial literacy which would result in 
trusting less likely in investment advisors as Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) argue. Thus 
hypothesis 24 in Table 1 predicts that those who have used the Internet to make bank 
transactions trust less likely in investment advisors than those not familiar with this procedure.  
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Table 1 
Variable description and the related hypotheses. All the variables are dummies taking value of 1 or 0 except age, 
which takes values from 15 to 99. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered by the 
European Commission. Description of effects on trusting investment advisors: Negative: when the dummy 
equals one it has a negative effect on the probability to trust in investment advisors. Positive: variable has a 
positive effect on trust. – means the variable has no effect on trust.  
 
 
 
1. v501 Age (only variable that isn't a dummy) - v501age
2. v500 Gender = male Negative v500male
3. v497 Respondent is married - v497married
4. v187
It is hard to compare information from banks, about 
bank account features and charges Negative v187compareinfohard
5. v190
It is hard to understand the information given by 
financial institutions about the way their mortgages 
work and the risks involved Negative v190understandingishard
6. v193 It is hard to change banks Negative v193changinbanksishard
What are your top 3 financial priorities?
7. v93 Saving for retirement - v93saveforretirement
8. v94 Paying off debt - v94payoffdebt
9. v95 Buying a house/apartment - v95buyhouse
10. v96 Passing on money to children/grand-children - v96inherit
11. v97 Protecting my family in case I'm ill/unable to work - v97protection
12. v98 Having some savings for emergencies - v98savingsforemergency
13. v99 Living as well as I can on my current income - v99livingwell
14. v100 Starting up a business - v100startbusiness
I find thinking about my finances and financial 
services..?
15. v103 enjoyable Positive v103enjoy
16. v104 interesting Positive v104interest
17. v105 comforting Positive v105comfort
18. v106 intimidating Negative v106intimidating
19. v107 complicated Negative v107complicated
20. v108 dull Negative v108dull
21. v109 depressing Negative v109depressing
22. v119 I own stocks Negative v119stocks
23. v122 I have a mortgage Positive v122mortgage
24. v136 I have used the Internet to make bank transactions Negative v136banktransactions
25. v137 I have used the Internet to make other transactions - v137othertransactions
26. v145 I could consider obtaining stocks abroad Negative v145considerstocksabroad
Hypothesis 
number Code Variable description 
Effect on 
Trusting 
Investment 
Advisors Variable name 
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Respondents reporting to have made other transactions over the Internet are probably 
similarly capable of searching the Internet for options. However they might not be interested to 
do so or not even the target customers of banks. This questions is poorly defined as there is no 
definition on what kind of transactions are related. Therefore there is a large variation on what 
respondents might consider as other transactions. This study is more interested in the customers 
of banks who have made especially bank transactions. This variable doesn’t directly relate to 
investment advisors or banks in general and thus the hypothesis 25 is that this variable 
consisting of people who have made other transactions over the Internet doesn’t have an effect 
on the probability of trusting investment advisors.  
Lastly in Table 1 hypothesis 32 argues that people who agree that when making a 
transaction on the Internet, it is harder to sort out any problems that may arise, trust more likely 
in investment advisors than those disagreeing with this statement. The hypothesis is based on 
the assumption that people agreeing with this statement rather make the transactions in a bank 
27. v195 Having a bank account is expensive Negative v195expensive
28. v199
The marketing techniques of financial institutions 
are aggressive Negative v199agressivemarketing
29. v200
Information I get from financial institutions is clear 
and understandable Positive v200clearinfo
30. v203 Financial transaction are generally secure Positive v203secure
31. v204 Confidential information I give to banks or Positive v204confidentiality
32. v208
When making a transaction on the Internet, it is 
harder to sort out any problems that may arise Positive v208internettransactions
What is your nationality?
1 Belgium Belgium
2 Denmark Denmark
3 Germany Germany
4 Greece Greece
5 Italy Italy
6 Spain Spain
7 France France
8 Ireland Ireland
9 United Kingdom United Kingdom
10 Luxembourg Luxembourg
11 The Netherlands The Netherlands
12 Portugal Portugal
13 Finland Finland
14 Sweden Sweden
15 Austria Austria
Hypothesis 
number Code Variable description 
Effect on 
Trusting 
Investment 
Advisors Variable name 
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with the investment advisor and hence trust the advice they get on investments. These people 
feel that problems are easier to deal with a human and therefore they trust the advisor more than 
making the transactions online. 
Table 1 doesn’t present hypotheses for country differences in probabilities of trusting 
investment advisors. My assumption is that on average Europeans trust in financial advisors. 
However I would assume that this varies between countries. Especially Southern Europe could 
be suffering from a lack of trust in financial advisory as the culture differs from northern Europe 
quite substantially. I would argue that these differentiations could be caused by the variations 
in investor protection as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) suggested or at least the 
subjective experience of lacking protection. Therefore I would argue that the North Europeans 
trust more likely in investment advisors than South Europeans. Also the financial situation of 
the countries could have an effect on trustworthiness of banks in the eyes of the public.  
4. Data and Methods 
This research is based on the micro data from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is 
administered by the European Commission. The Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion 
surveys conducted regularly addressing topical issues. The survey is conducted in EU member 
states. Eurobarometer 60.2 covers households from 15 EU countries including Finland and 
consists of more than 16 000 respondents. The survey was done on November-December 2003. 
Unfortunately questions relevant to this study were only asked in this Eurobarometer and 
therefore no more recent data is available addressing this matter. Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
provide detailed descriptive statistics on the data and Table 1 reports the variable coding and 
descriptions. Table 2 provides brief summary of the descriptive statistics.  
The study is conducted using logistic regression analysis. This type of model is more 
suitable than ordinary least squares method as logistic model is used to predict the outcome of 
a categorical dependent variable. In this research dependent variable is binary taking values of 
either zero or one determined by the respondents’ answer whether he usually trusts investment 
advisors or not. Also all the explanatory variables are dummies with binary response possibility 
except respondent’s age which can take values from 15 to 99. As the dependent variable is 
binary the results describe differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors. The 
results are presented as marginal effects which describe the difference in probability of trusting 
investment advisors between two groups such as men and women. Section 8 provides also some 
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unrefined probabilities from descriptive statistics of Eurobarometer 60.2 survey to illustrate the 
overall likelihood of trusting investment advisors as it is reported in the survey.  
 
Table 2 
Summary of descriptive statistics. All the variables are dummies. Trust is a dummy variable that equals one 
when respondent agrees to usually trust in the advice given by financial institutions. v500male equals one when 
the respondent is male. v497marrried equals one when the respondent is married. v119 stocks and v122mortgage 
equal one when the respondent owns stocks or has a mortgage. Country dummies indicate the home country of 
the respondent. Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 provide the descriptive statistics in detail. 
Variable name N % 
Trust 8138 50,7 % 
v500male 7702 48,0 % 
v497married 7946 49,5 % 
v119stocks 2585 16,1 % 
v122mortgage 3699 23,0 % 
Belgium 1017 6,3 % 
Denmark 1000 6,2 % 
Germany 2045 12,7 % 
Greece 1002 6,2 % 
Italy 997 6,2 % 
Spain 1000 6,2 % 
France 1004 6,3 % 
Ireland 1007 6,3 % 
United Kingdom 1338 8,3 % 
Luxembourg 600 3,7 % 
The Netherlands 1016 6,3 % 
Portugal 1000 6,2 % 
Finland 1001 6,2 % 
Sweden 1000 6,2 % 
Austria 1032 6,4 % 
      
Total 16059   
 
The data contains numerous variables but this research will focus on those relating to 
financial services and demographics. The survey contains information on financial priorities, 
holding stocks and having a mortgage, price sensitivity and expectations towards financial 
advisory just to name a few variables relevant to this study. The respondents are asked if they 
find the marketing of financial institutions aggressive and whether they find the information 
given clear and understandable. All these variables help to understand what drives trust in 
financial advisors and why certain people tend to put more trust in the advisory. Table 1 presents 
all the variables used in the logistic regression models and the questions they are related to. 
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5. Results on the effects of grouped variables 
This section is divided into eight subsections to clarify the results of independent logistic 
regression models explaining the probability to trust in investment advisors. The models are 
provided in subsection 5.1 in Table 3 and in the end of subsection 5.4 in Table 4. The tables 
report the marginal effects of the variables in each independent model. The subsections 
introduce variables grouped by their question on Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and their effects 
on the probability to trust. The coding and questions that the variables are related are reported 
in Table 1. Variables are grouped by question to assess their explanatory power and conclude 
whether they are relevant factors and adding explanatory power to the final model. These 
logistic regressions are combined into a complete model explaining trust in Model 8 presented 
in Table 4 and the results are discussed in subsection 5.8. 50,7% of the respondents of the 
Eurobarometer 60,2 survey trusted in investment advisors. Descriptive statistics of the data are 
provided in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. Table 3 and Table 4 report the results of each model 
discussed in the subsections.  
5.1. Model 1: the effect of demographics 
This section covers results of a binary logistic regression model explaining the probability to 
trust in investment advisors with respondents’ demographics. Table 3 reports the results under 
Model 1 as marginal effects. First explanatory variable in Model 1 is respondent’s age which 
doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on trusting investment advisors. This result 
supports the hypothesis and is in line with previous research (Robinson and Jackson, 2001; 
Sutter and Kocher, 2007 etc.). The second variable in Model 1 is gender which reports a 
statistically significant result at 5% significance level. The result indicates that men trust in 
investment advisors 2,7 percentage points less likely than women do on average. This result is 
not a surprise as many studies have found similar gender effects on trust in other fields of 
science (Croson and Bunchan, 1999, Charness and Gneezy 2012 etc). Third variable explaining 
trust in investment advisors is marital status which reports a positive statistically significant 
effect at 5% significance level. Married people trust 3,9 percentage points more likely in 
investment advisors on average than those who aren’t married. This result conflicts with the 
hypothesis that marital status doesn’t have an effect on trusting investment advisors. However 
as this model has only few control variables these results need further studying. 
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Table 3 
Binary logistic regression models explaining trust in investment advisors. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 
which is administered by the European Commission. Respondents’ are asked whether they agree or disagree with 
the statement “I usually trust the advice given by financial institutions”. When the answer is yes, this dependent 
variable equals one. The logistic regression models explain trust with variables listed in Table 1. Table 1 provides 
variable explanations and coding. The left column of each model presents the marginal effects and the right column 
presents z-statistics. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
             
dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat
v501age 0,000 (0,14)
v500male -0,027** (-3,52)
v497married 0,039** (4,93)
v187compareinfohard
v190understandingishard
v193changingbanksishard
v93saveforretirement 0,07** (6,34)
v94payoffdebt 0,021* (2,05)
v95buyhouse 0,000 (-0,04)
v96inherit 0,047** (3,95)
v97protection 0,047** (4,82)
v98savingsforemergency 0,03** (3,43)
v99livingwell 0,025** (2,76)
v100startbusiness -0,033 (-1,45)
v103enjoy 0,001 (0,07)
v104interest 0,089** (8,65)
v105comfort 0,129** (10,84)
v106intimidating -0,036** (-3,29)
v107complicated 0,012 (1,25)
v108dull -0,007 (-0,55)
v109depressing -0,075** (-6,84)
v119stocks 0,079** (7,16)
v122mortgage 0,049** (5,17)
v136banktransactions
v137othertransactions
v145considerstocksabroad
v195expensive
v199agressivemarketing
v200clearinfo
v203secure
v204confidentiality
v208internettransactions
Denmark 0,149** (7,07)
Germany -0,017 (-0,88)
Greece -0,371** (18,63)
Italy -0,238** (-11,07)
Spain -0,156** (-7,11)
France -0,106** (-4,79)
Ireland -0,048* (-2,19)
UnitedK -0,09** (-4,34)
Luxembourg -0,019 (-0,75)
TheNether -0,058** (-2,62)
Portugal -0,16** (-7,31)
Finland 0,169** (8,08)
Sweden -0,044* (-1,97)
Autria 0,086** (4,01)
pseudo R² 0,053 0,004 0,017 0,004
number of observations 16059 16059 16059 16059
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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       Table 3 presents respondents’ home countries as control variables with Belgium as the 
reference group. The results show that Finland has the highest probability of trusting investment 
advisors and Greece has the lowest. The marginal effects show these differences in reference 
to Belgium. For example Italians trust 23,8 percentage points less likely in investment advisors 
than Belgians. Three countries with the lowest probability of trusting are Greece, Italy and 
Portugal with the largest negative marginal effects. People trusting most likely in investment 
advisors seem to live in Finland, Denmark and Austria. Country differences are discussed 
further in detail in sections 7 and 8. 
5.2. Model 2: the effect of financial priorities 
This section focuses on binary logistic regression model on respondents’ financial 
priorities. Table 3 reports the results of this regression under Model 2. In this section 
respondents answered the question of their top three financial priorities. Table 1 reports all the 
variables with explanations in more detail.  
Model 2 reports all but two independent variables’ marginal effects as statistically 
significant at 5% significance level. Variables indicating saving to buy a house and saving to 
start own business do not significantly affect on trusting financial advisors. Other financial 
priorities seem to have a positive effect on the probability of trusting financial advisors. Saving 
for retirement as a financial priority has the largest marginal effect. People selecting this as their 
priority are 7,0 percentage points more likely to trust in investment advisors than those not 
prioritizing saving for retirement. The smallest marginal effect has variable indicating paying 
off debt. Pseudo R² can’t be interpreted similarly to R² of OLS regression but it also tries to 
predict the model fit and its values range from zero to one. The pseudo R² of Table 2 indicates 
rather low explanatory power for this model and therefore the results must be interpreted with 
caution.  
5.3. Model 3: the effect of sentiment towards thinking about finances and financial services 
Eurobarometer survey 60.2 asks about people’s sentiment towards thinking about their 
own finances and financial services. As discussed previously intuitively it would seem logical 
that people thinking positively about their finances would trust financial advisors more likely 
and those with negative feelings towards their own finances would be less likely to trust. This 
section presents binary logistic regression models results examining this effect. Model 3 reports 
the results of this regression in Table 3.  
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The results are somewhat conflicting. In general the hypothesis seems to hold and positive 
sentiment variables have positive effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors and 
negative sentiment variables have negative effect. However variable “enjoyable” doesn’t have 
a statistically significant marginal effect nor has variables “complicated” and “dull”. Therefore 
only two variables with positive sentiment and two variables with negative sentiment are left 
for closer examination as they have a statistically significant marginal effects at 5% significance 
level.  
Model 3 in Table 3 reports that people who find thinking about their finances and financial 
services interesting are 8,9 percentage points more likely to trust in financial advisors than those 
who disagree with them. Those who find it comforting are 12,9 percentage points more likely 
to trust advisors than those not finding it comforting. This would support the hypotheses 
presented in Table 1. On the other hand those who find thinking about their finances 
intimidating are 3,6 percentage points less likely to trust advisors than those disagreeing with 
them and those finding it depressing are 7,5 percentage points less likely to trust than those not 
finding it depressing. At least this model with limited control variables would support the theory 
that sentiment toward people’s own finances affects the probability of trusting financial 
advisors. However this effect has to be investigated more in detail when adding explanatory 
variables to logistic regression model.  
5.4. Model 4: the effect of owning stocks or having a mortgage 
Does owning stocks or having a mortgage effect on the probability of trusting investment 
advisors? This is the question this section attempts to answer with binary logistic regression 
model. Model 4 in Table 3 reports the results of the logistic regression.  
Both variables have a statistically significant coefficient at 5% significance level. This 
relatively small logistic regression model suggests that people owning stocks trust 7,9 
percentage points more likely in investment advisors than those who don’t own stocks. This 
result doesn’t support the hypothesis that people owning stocks would have higher level of 
financial literacy and therefore would exercise more caution towards advice. On the contrary 
this result would suggest that stock owners were more willing to trust the advice than those not 
owning stocks. Model 4 reports that people having a mortgage loan trust almost five percentage 
points more likely in investment advisors than those who don’t have a mortgage supporting the 
23. hypothesis presented Table 1. However these effects definitely require closer examination 
when adding control variables as the pseudo R² of the model is relatively low indicating low 
explanatory power.  
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Table 4 
Binary logistic regression models explaining trust in investment advisors. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 
which is administered by the European Commission. Respondents’ are asked whether they agree or disagree with 
the statement “I usually trust the advice given by financial institutions”. When the answer is yes, this dependent 
variable takes the value of 1. The logistic regression model explains trust with variables listed in Table 1. Table 1 
provides variable explanations and coding. The left column of each model presents the marginal effects of each 
variable and the right column presents z-statistics. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
  
dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat
v501age 0,000 (1,61)
v500male -0,040** (-5,35)
v497married 0,013 (1,58)
v187compareinfohard -0,049** (-5,64) -0,023** (-2,80)
v190understandingishard -0,047** (-5,49) -0,001 (-0,13)
v193changingbanksishard -0,051** (-4,88) -0,021* (-2,10)
v93saveforretirement 0,024* (2,33)
v94payoffdebt 0,018 (1,79)
v95buyhouse -0,002 (-0,13)
v96inherit 0,021 (1,87)
v97protection 0,025** (2,63)
v98savingsforemergency 0,03** (3,64)
v99livingwell 0,005 (0,59)
v100startbusiness 0,007 (0,31)
v103enjoy -0,009 (-0,70)
v104interest 0,027** (2,66)
v105comfort 0,029* (2,50)
v106intimidating -0,006 (-0,53)
v107complicated 0,012 (1,34)
v108dull -0,007 (-0,65)
v109depressing -0,060** (-5,75)
v119stocks 0,008 (0,70)
v122mortgage 0,003* (0,29)
v136banktransactions 0,081** (5,94) -0,028 (-2,11)
v137othertransactions 0,015 (0,92) 0,012** (0,78)
v145considerstocksabroad -0,033 (-1,04) -0,077 (-2,63)
v195expensive 0,004 (0,47) -0,000* (-0,02)
v199agressivemarketing -0,016* (-2,05) -0,017** (-2,19)
v200clearinfo 0,151** (19,18) 0,135** (16,74)
v203secure 0,115** (14,10) 0,096** (11,53)
v204confidentiality 0,163** (21,91) 0,132** (16,95)
v208internettransactions 0,026** (3,24) 0,016* (2,01)
Denmark 0,119 (5,37)
Germany 0,040 (2,15)
Greece -0,269 (-12,46)
Italy -154 (-7,17)
Spain -0,130 (-6,11)
France -0,034 (-1,58)
Ireland -0,020 (-0,94)
UnitedK -0,052 (-2,56)
Luxembourg -0,047 (-1,91)
TheNether -0,044 (-2,04)
Portugal -0,097 (-4,46)
Finland 0,128 (5,81)
Sweden -0,044 (-1,99)
Autria 0,120 (5,75)
pseudo R² 0,004 0,007 0,078 0,119
number of observations 16059 16059 16059 16059
Model 7 Model 8Model 5 Model 6
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5.5. Model 5: the effect of Internet usage and obtaining stocks abroad 
This section presents the results of a binary logistic regression model with three 
explanatory variables. First two answer the question whether one has ever used the Internet to 
make either bank transactions or other transactions. Intuitively those who are more familiar 
with technology could have higher level of financial literacy as the Internet offers information 
about different choices and therefore these people could also be more cautious to trust in 
investment advisors. Those familiar with using the Internet can also obtain information about 
the costs related to products investment advisors are selling compared to passive investing. The 
third variable asks if the respondent could consider obtaining stocks abroad. People investing 
globally could be considered to have at least satisfactory knowledge on finance and therefore 
could be expected to trust less likely in financial advisors as they would know the costs related 
to their products. Model 5 in Table 4 reports the results of this logistic regression.  
The intuition seems to fail in this case as Model 5 reports that people who have made 
bank transactions over the Internet are eight percentage points more likely to trust in investment 
advisors than those who haven’t. This is the only statistically significant result at 5% 
significance level from this logistic regression model. Considering that pseudo R² is relatively 
low which indicates that the model has little explanatory power I would argue that this matter 
requires more examination over a larger logistic regression model with increased amount of 
control variables. 
5.6. Model 6: the effect of difficulties related to financial services 
If people think understanding information given by financial institutions is hard it could 
be assumed that they are less willing to trust this information. This section covers difficulties 
related to financial services and how they affect the probability of trusting in financial advisors. 
The first explanatory variable consists of people finding it hard to compare information from 
banks, about bank account features and charges. The second variable includes those 
respondents who find it hard to understand the information given by financial institutions about 
the way their mortgages work and the risks involved. The third variable consists of those who 
find it hard to change banks.  
All of these variables are of negative character and therefore the hypothesis is that they 
all have a negative effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. Model 6 in Table 
4 reports the results of this binary logistic regression model. 
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The results of Model 6 in Table 4 support the hypotheses. All the variables have a negative 
statistically significant coefficient at 5% significance level. Those finding it hard to compare 
information from banks, about bank account features and charges trust 4,9 percentage points 
less likely in investment advisors than those finding it easy. Respondents not understanding the 
information given by financial institutions about the way their mortgages work and the risks 
involved trust 4,7 percentage points less likely in financial advisors than those not having 
problems understanding. Also those who find it hard to change banks trust 5,1 percentage points 
less likely in advisory. 
These results support intuition. For example people finding it hard to compare 
information in this case also probably find it hard to compare the information given by 
investment advisors. As the understanding of the issue is limited it would be irrational to trust 
the advice. People finding it hard to change banks are stuck with their current service provider 
and therefore if they don’t agree with the advice given to them, their probability to trust is bound 
to drop.  
5.7. Model 7: the effect of financial services and banks’ actions 
This section covers variables related to financial services and banks’ actions. A binary 
logistic regression model is used to model the effect these variables have on the probability of 
trusting in financial advisors. The first control variable in the model covers people who think 
that having a bank account is expensive. Second variable consists of those who think that the 
marketing techniques of financial institutions are aggressive. The hypothesis is that both of 
these variables have a negative effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors as 
reported in Table 1. Third variable asks whether the respondent finds the information he gets 
from financial institutions clear and understandable. Fourth variable consists of those who find 
financial transaction generally secure. Fifth variable covers people who think that the 
confidential information they give to banks or insurance companies is adequately protected. 
These variables are positive by character and as presented in Table 1 hypothesis is that they all 
have a positive effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. The last variable in this 
logistic regression model consists of those who think that when making a transaction on the 
Internet, it is harder to sort out any problems that may arise. Model 7 in Table 4 reports the 
results. 
The only variable that doesn’t have a statistically significant marginal effect at 5% 
significance level in this binary logistic regression is the one representing cost sensitiveness 
and hence it has no effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. All the other 
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variables have statistically significant results. Respondents finding the marketing techniques of 
banks aggressive trust 1,6 percentage points less likely in investment advisors than those who 
disagree with this statement. Respondents who think that the information given by financial 
institutions is clear and understandable trust 15,1 percentage points more likely in investment 
advisory than those not finding it clear. This result is no surprise as if one finds information 
from advisors hard to understand it would be irrational to trust it. Those finding that bank 
transactions are generally secure trust investment advisors 11,5 percentage points more likely 
than those believing them to be unsecure. These results support the hypotheses presented in 
Table 1.  
People who think that the confidential information they give to banks or insurance 
companies is adequately protected trust 16,3 percentage points more likely in investment 
advisors than those finding confidentiality violated. Lastly Model 7 in Table 4 reports 
respondents believing that when making a transaction on the Internet, it is harder to sort out any 
problems that may arise, trusting 2,6 percentage points more likely in investment advisors than 
those disagreeing with this statement. The result would suggest that people who are less familiar 
with using the Internet would rather visit face-to-face an investment advisor and therefore prefer 
their advice over consultation over the Internet.  
5.8. Model 8: combined model explaining trust in investment advisors 
After constructing separate logistic regressions of grouped variables adding these 
variables into one single model explaining trust in investment advisors gives a larger 
perspective on the actual effect what each of these variables have. Therefore this section 
presents the results of a binary logistic regression model which combines all the variables 
explained more in detail in the upper subsections. Model 8 in Table 4 reports the results. 
The first three explanatory variables of Model 8 in Table 4 are demographics and they 
have similar results to those presented in subsection 5.1. Age doesn’t have a statistically 
significant effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. Appendix 3 plots the 
likelihood of trusting in advisory by age group and reports almost horizontal line. This result 
supports the earlier studies that conclude similar results (Robinson and Jackson, 2001; Sutter 
and Kocher, 2007). Model 8 in Table 4 reports that men trust in investment advisors four 
percentage points less likely than women. This result is found already in Model 1 but adding 
the amount of explanatory variables in the model increases the effect. Therefore it is save to 
argue that gender does have a statistically significant effect on the probability of trusting 
investment advisors at 5% significance level. Adding explanatory variables diminishes the 
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effect of marital status and Model 8 shows no statistically significant effect for this variable 
even though it was found in the smaller logistic regression in Model 1 discussed in section 5.1.  
The next three variables in the logistic regression model are related to difficulties with 
financial services. The first of these variables consists of those finding it hard to compare 
information from banks, about bank account features and charges. Model 8 in Table 4 reports 
that these respondents trust 2,3 percentage points less likely in investment advisors that those 
finding it easy to compare information. This result is almost double the effect compared to the 
results of Model 6 discussed in section 5.6 and supports the hypothesis presented in Table 1. 
The next variable from this group includes respondents not understanding the information given 
by financial institutions about the way their mortgages work and the risks involved. As in Model 
6 the coefficient of this variable is negative but in Model 8 the result is not statistically 
significant. Therefore arguing that people understanding poorly the information given would 
trust less likely in investment advisors is not supported by this study. The last variable from this 
group consists of respondents agreeing that it is hard to change banks. Model 8 shows that these 
respondents trust investment advisors 2,1 percentage points less likely than those disagreeing 
with this statement. The result is statistically significant at 5% significance level and supports 
the hypothesis.  
The next group of variables addresses respondents’ top three financial priorities. These 
variables are first introduced in section 5.2 and the hypothesis is that none of these variables 
have a statistically significant effect on the probability of trusting advisors. However Model 8 
in Table 4 reports three priorities with statistically significant coefficients at 5% significance 
level. People saving for retirement, people saving for emergencies and people protecting their 
family in case of inability to work are all more likely to trust in investment advisors than those, 
who didn’t prioritize these. All of these marginal effects are between 2,4 and 3,0 percentage 
points. Other financial priorities show no significant effect on the probability of trusting 
investment advisors. Model 2 discussed in section 5.2 reports similar although somewhat larger 
effects. Adding explanatory variables to the logistic regression model diminishes the effects 
and leaves most of the financial priorities without significant results. However this result can 
be expected as the pseudo R² of the logistic regression model number 2 reported in Table 3 is 
relatively low and indicates that financial priorities don’t have much explanatory power on 
trusting investment advisors.  
Next set of variables answer the question how people find thinking about their finances 
and financial services. This question is examined in more detail in section 5.3. Model 8 reports 
statistically significant coefficients for three sentiment related variables. People finding their 
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finances enjoyable trust investment advisors 2,6 percentage points less likely on average than 
those disagreeing with them. This result is statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
Interesting is that this effect is significantly larger than Model 3 presented in Table 3. Increasing 
the number of control variables in the binary logistic regression model increases also the effect 
that this variable has on the probability of trusting investment advisors. The result validates the 
use of a larger model to truly examine the effects of each variable in a larger perspective. 
Without adding control variables it would be difficult to establish reliable and convincing 
results. This finding invalidates the hypothesis that people having positive feelings towards 
thinking about their finances would trust more likely in investment advisors than those having 
negative feelings.  
The next statistically significant result is that people who find thinking about their 
finances and financial services comforting trust on average 2,9 percentage points more likely 
in investment advisors that those answering to disagree with this statement. This result supports 
the evidence presented in section 5.3 although the effect decreases when adding control 
variables to the model. Model 8 indicates that people who find thinking about their finances 
and financial services depressing trust on average 6,0 percentage points less likely in investment 
advisors than those not finding it depressing. This is statistically significant result at 5% 
significance level and supports the findings stated in section 5.3. The other sentiment related 
variables don’t have statistically significant marginal effects at 5% significance level and 
therefore can’t be argued to have an effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors.  
The logistic regression model number 8 presented in Table 4 suggests that either owning 
stocks or having a mortgage doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on the probability of 
trusting investment advisors. Therefore these results find no support for the 22. and 23. 
hypotheses presented in Table 1. People who have made transactions over the Internet are 2,8 
percentage points less likely to trust in investment advisors than those who haven’t. This result 
is statistically significant 5% significance level and disagrees with Model 5 reporting a positive 
effect. However adding control variables reveals the negative effect and this result supports the 
hypothesis that people familiar with the Internet have a greater possibility to access information 
related to choices and costs of financial products. This logistic regression model results that 
making other transactions over the Internet doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of trusting investment advisors as predicted in Table 1. People who could consider 
buying stocks abroad trust 7,7 percentage points less likely on average in investment advisors 
than those not willing to buy. This result supports the hypothesis that people investing globally 
have higher level of financial literacy and therefore also a better understanding of costs related 
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to products investment advisors try to sell. Result is conflicting to the evidence of Model 5 
concluding that adding control variables into the model discovers the true effect of willingness 
to invest abroad.  
Model 8 doesn’t find a statistically significant connection between probability of trusting 
investment advisors and finding a bank account expensive. However those thinking that the 
marketing techniques of financial institutions are aggressive trust 1,7 percentage points less 
likely on average in investment advisors than those not finding marketing aggressive. This 
supports intuition and is consistent with the result presented Model 7 and further discussed in 
section 5.7. Respondents finding the information they get from financial institutions clear and 
understandable trust 13,5 percentage points more likely in investment advisors than those 
finding the information unclear. Those finding financial transaction generally secure trust 9,6 
percentage points more likely in investment advisors than those not believing them to be secure. 
People agreeing that the confidential information they give to banks or insurance companies is 
adequately protected trust 13,2 percentage points more likely in investment advisors than those 
disagreeing. All of these results are statistically significant at 5% significance level and 
supporting the earlier results from a smaller logistic regression model number 7 presented in 
Table 4. They are also supporting the hypotheses presented in Table 1. This logistic regression 
model suggests that people agreeing that when making a transaction on the Internet, it is harder 
to sort out any problems that may arise, trust 1,6 percentage points more likely in investment 
advisors than those disagreeing with them. This result validates the hypothesis that people 
finding it hard to sort out problems this way rather do business face-to-face with an advisor and 
therefore are more willing to trust their advice.  
The last variables of Model 8 present country dummies indicating respondents’ home 
country. The reference group for the dummies is Belgium and therefore the marginal effects 
reported in Table 4 are in relation to this reference group. Therefore it isn’t possible to argue 
anything about the statistical significance of these variables as the p-values only represent 
whether the variable differs significantly from the values of Belgium. However the marginal 
effects remain the same in relation to each other no matter the reference group. Therefore it is 
possible to compare the difference of the effects.  
Model 8 shows that Greece has the lowest likelihood of trusting investment advisors 
comparing to other EU countries. The highest probability of trust in investment advisory is 
reported from Finland. Right at the second place ranking the countries for their probability of 
trusting investment advisory is Austria and at third is Denmark. Supporting the initial 
hypothesis trust is the lowest in the most southern parts of Europe. The second lowest trusting 
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country before Greece is Italy and at third is Spain. Section 7 presents the probability of trusting 
investment advisory by country in Graph 1. Here the country dummies serve as control 
variables. 
This rather large binary logistic regression model clarifies the big picture of variables 
affecting the probability of trusting investment advisory. However to discover the true influence 
of relevant factors removing the insignificant irrelevant factors improves the model by 
eliminating possible collinearity. Therefore the final model explaining trust in investment 
advisors doesn’t include all the variables presented in this larger logistic regression. 
6. Eliminating irrelevant factors 
Having as many variables as possible in a binary logistic regression model doesn’t 
necessarily improve the model or its predictability power. On the contrary having irrelevant 
variables included in the model might even distort the outcome. Therefore it is important to 
acknowledge the most relevant factors influencing the probability of trusting investment 
advisors to conduct a credible logistic regression model predicting as accurate results as 
possible.  
Binary regression model presented in Table 4 under Model 8 and discussed in section 5.8 
included 46 variables in total. This constitutes as a rather large model and it is reasonable to 
critically evaluate which of these variables truly influence people’s probability to trust in 
investment advisors. The decision which variables to include in the final model is made based 
on both the hypotheses and the results from the logistic regression models presented in the 
earlier sections. This section presents the rationale behind eliminating certain variables and on 
the other hand including others in the final model explaining probability of trusting investment 
advisors.  
The first group of variables include respondents’ demographics. As discussed previously 
neither respondents’ age nor their marital status shows statistically significant effect on the 
probability of trusting investment advisors. Both arguments in favor of elderly people trusting 
less likely in investment advisors and arguments against it can be rationalized as discussed in 
section 3. Appendix 3 plots the trust percentage by age group from Eurobarometer 60,2 and 
presents almost horizontal line. As the evidence shows no effect and the rationale for the effect 
is contradictory variable indicating respondents’ age is eliminated from the model. The 
evidence supports the hypothesis that marital status has no statistically significant effect on 
trusting investment advisors. This justifies the elimination of marital status as a variable from 
28 
 
the final model. Other demographics are included in the model as the evidence shows 
significant gender effect on trust and differentiations between countries as well.  
Section 5.6 introduces variables related to difficulties respondents’ face with their 
financial services. All of these variables have a strong rationale why they should have an effect 
on the probability of trusting investment advisors. Even though Model 8 reports no statistically 
significant coefficient for variable consisting of those who find it hard to understand the 
information given by financial institutions about the way their mortgages work and the risks 
involved it would be irrational to eliminate just one of the variables related to this group. 
Hypothesis is that this variable should have a negative effect on the probability to trust and 
therefore the final model contains also this variable. Removing all variables not having a 
statistically significant effect on the probability to trust in investment advisors wouldn’t serve 
the purpose of this study as it is relevant to acknowledge also those variables not affecting the 
probability to trust. The reason for eliminating variables from the larger model is not to exclude 
all statistically insignificant variables but to remove those not relevant for this study.  
The next set of variables is related to respondents’ financial priorities and hypotheses 7-
14 in Table 1. As already discussed in section 5.2 the explanatory power of these variables 
alone is low. However three of the priorities have a statistically significant coefficient in the 
larger logistic regression model reported in Table 4. Therefore further investigation is needed 
on the effect that persons’ financial priorities have on the probability of trusting in financial 
advisors. The initial hypotheses is that people with different financial priorities don’t trust 
differently in investment advisors. Therefore it is clear that these variables should be included 
in the final model as they have a valid rationale to be included.  
The extensive logistic regression model in Table 4 reports next the variables related to 
sentiment that respondents’ have towards thinking about their finances and financial services. 
As expressed in the previous section three of these sentiment variables have a statistically 
significant effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. To investigate more the 
hypothesis that negative feelings result in decrease in the probability to trust and positive 
sentiment results in trusting more likely, the variables related to this question have a valid 
rationale to be included in the final model. Even though not every variable from this category 
has a statistically significant effect on the probability of trusting it wouldn’t be sensible to drop 
them out when others are included. To gain a full understanding about the effect respondents’ 
sentiment towards thinking about their finances and financial services have on the probability 
to trust all of the variables associated with this question should be included. 
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Evidence shows that there is no connection between the probability to trust in investment 
advisors and owning stocks or having a mortgage. Therefore the hypothesis that people owning 
stocks would trust less likely in investment advisors has to be rejected. Also the hypothesis 
suggesting that people having a mortgage would trust more likely in investment advisors than 
those not having a mortgage loan is rejected based on the results of Model 8 presented in section 
5.8. Additionally the explanatory power of these variables seems to be low and therefore they 
are not included in the final model explaining probability of trusting.  
Respondents who have made transactions over the Internet are more likely to trust in 
investment advisory than those not familiar with the procedure. This result is statistically 
significant at 5% significance level in both Model 5 and Model 8. As there is no question about 
the connection of this variable to the probability of trusting it is also included in the final model. 
Evidence shows that there is no connection between probability to trust and those who have 
made other transactions over the Internet. As previously discussed in section 3 this variable is 
poorly defined and therefore it is eliminated from the final model explaining trust in investment 
advisors. No evidence is found supporting the hypothesis that respondents who could consider 
obtaining stocks abroad would trust less likely in investment advisors than those not willing to 
consider. However there is a strong rationale why there should be a connection and therefore 
this variable is included in the final model to investigate further this matter.  
Variables related to hypotheses 27-32 in Table 1 and further discussed in section 5.7 all 
need to be taken into consideration in the final binary logistic regression model explaining trust. 
These variables are related to financial services as a whole and intuitively have an effect on 
trusting investment advisors. For example people finding the marketing techniques of financial 
institutions aggressive are probably less likely to trust in investment advisors. The variables 
from this group all have a clear rationale how they should effect on the probability of trusting 
investment advisors presented in Table 1 and therefore there is no reason to exclude them. Also 
most of them are statistically significant at 5% significance level in the large logistic regression 
model reported in Table 4.  
7. The final model explaining trust in investment advisors and interpretations 
This section covers the most important discoveries of this research. Here I present the 
final binary logistic regression model explaining probability of trusting investment advisors. 
This model combines all the relevant factors discovered and discussed in the previous sections. 
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Table 5 reports final results of this binary logistic regression model. This section also offers 
detailed discussion and interpretations for these results. 
The final model reveals similar results compared to the larger logistic regression model 
presented in Table 4. Men are 3,9 percentage points less likely to trust in investment advisors 
than women. This result comes as no surprise as there are many articles studying the gender 
effect in other contexts (Croson and Bunchan, 1999, Charness and Gneezy 2012 etc.). Men are 
generally more overconfident than women (Lundeberg, Fox and Puncochar, 1994) and 
therefore it makes sense that men find their own knowledge sufficient enough to make financial 
decisions without the help of investment advisors. Prince (1993) states that men feel more 
competent in financial matters than women do. Men might be even threatened by the advisors 
and their knowledge as they might feel they should be able to make financial decisions on their 
own. Financial industry is also mostly male-dominated hence men experience more 
overconfidence making financial decisions than women. Women also score lower in financial 
literacy tests (Chen and Volpe, 2002; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008). There are a number of 
previous studies arguing that the difference in confidence is the greatest for tasks perceived as 
masculine (Deaux and Emswiller, 1974, Lenney 1977, Beyer and Bowden, 1997). Investment 
decisions can be viewed as a traditional masculine task and therefore it can be argued that 
women feel themselves more insecure making these decisions than men. Consequently women 
seek more willingly help for these decisions from investment advisors and are more willing to 
accept this advice and trust on it than men. As Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) argued 
those trusting advisory are too anxious to invest by themselves and the advisors are able to 
provide them a piece of mind.  
There are also other factors that could explain the result of men trusting less likely in 
investment advisors. On average women take less risk as their participation in the stock market 
is lower than men (Sundén and Surette, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; Dwyer, Gilkeson, and 
List, 2002; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén, 2003). Previous research finds women more risk 
averse than men (Barsky et al., 1997; Eckel and Grossman, 2008: Croson and Gneezy, 2009 
etc). Halko, Kaustia and Alanko (2012) show that this risk aversion extends to finance 
professionals and wealthy private banking customers as well. Therefore lower financial literacy 
can’t fully explain the risk aversion women experience. These results could partly explain why 
women trust more likely in investment advisors than men. If women are more risk averse they 
probably need more evidence to support their financial decisions and wish to discuss different 
possibilities with a professional. This professional is able to provide them with reassurance and 
increase their confidence in their decisions. 
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Table 5 
The final binary logistic regression model explaining trust in investment advisors. The data is from Eurobarometer 
60.2 which is administered by the European Commission. Respondents’ are asked whether they agree or disagree 
with the statement “I usually trust the advice given by financial institutions”. When the answer is yes, this 
dependent variable takes the value of 1. The logistic regression model explains trust with selected variables of 
those listed in Table 1. Table 1 provides variable explanations and coding. The left column of the model presents 
the marginal effects of each variable and the right column presents z-statistics. * and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
dy/dx z-stat
v500male -0,039** (-5,28)
v187compareinfohard -0,022** (-2,65)
v190understandingishard -0,001 (-0,17)
v193changingbanksishard -0,020* (-2,02)
v93saveforretirement 0,028** (2,67)
v94payoffdebt 0,0178 (1,81)
v95buyhouse -0,006 (-0,54)
v96inherit 0,027* (2,43)
v97protection 0,028** (3,13)
v98savingsforemergency 0,031** (3,82)
v99livingwell 0,006 (0,67)
v100startbusiness 0,000 (0,01)
v103enjoy -0,008 (-0,65)
v104interest 0,028** (2,79)
v105comfort 0,031** (2,67)
v106intimidating -0,006 (-0,54)
v107complicated 0,012 (1,29)
v108dull -0,008 (-0,72)
v109depressing -0,062** (-5,99)
v136banktransactions -0,022* (-2,24)
v145considerstocksabroad -0,070* (-2,43)
v195expensive 0,001 (0,16)
v199agressivemarketing -0,016* (-2,01)
v200clearinfo 0,135** (16,78)
v203secure 0,097** (11,61)
v204confidentiality 0,132** (16,96)
v208internettransactions 0,014 (1,81)
Denmark 0,121** (5,49)
Germany 0,040* (2,14)
Greece -0,267** (-12,38)
Italy -0,153** (-7,12)
Spain -0,128** (-6,04)
France -0,034 (-1,58)
Ireland -0,019 (-0,89)
UnitedK -0,048* (-2,36)
Luxembourg -0,046 (-1,84)
TheNether -0,041 (-1,89)
Portugal -0,096** (-4,41)
Finland 0,130** (5,93)
Sweden -0,039 (-1,79)
Autria 0,120** (5,76)
pseudo R² 0,118
number of observations 16059
Model 9
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Model 9 in Table 5 reports that respondents finding it hard to compare information from 
banks, about bank account features and charges trust 2,2 percentage points less likely in 
investment advisors than those finding it easy. The result is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. People finding information from bank account features and charges hard to 
compare probably believe that investment advisors are cheaters who only think about their own 
interest and try to charge as high fees as possible. Even if this wasn’t the case comparing 
information is a vital building block of trust as when the other party of the negotiation doesn’t 
understand his options, it is impossible for the advisor to argue his case. After all deal closure 
only occurs when the customer trusts the advice and understands what he is buying. If the 
customer feels that it is impossible to compare charges and banks it would be rational to think 
that there is no option but to choose one of the equally bad choices. This kind of thinking doesn’t 
help to build trust and only serves the bank poorly as it is in their interest to build trusting 
relationship and sell their products. A trusting customer comes back and profits the bank. 
Following the argumentation of Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) the bank is able to 
charge higher fees from customers who trust the advice given to them. Therefore this result 
leads to the conclusion that educating customers about the information related to bank account 
features and charges would actually benefit banks as the likelihood to trust in investment 
advisory would increase. As Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny suggest investors don’t consider 
the fees as costs when the advisor is able to provide them a piece of mind.  
Goldstein, Johnson and Sharpe (2008) argue that retail investors face difficult decisions 
with all the information and financial products available for them. The sheer amount of products 
and possibilities could overwhelm the investor and therefore he could begin to doubt the advice 
given by a single financial institution. These investors face the problem of trying to compare 
all the information available to make an investment decision and the limited time available for 
that. This could partly explain why those feeling that it is hard to compare information given to 
them are less likely to trust in investment advisors. When there is a tremendous amount of 
information available for them to compare it becomes harder to process. Trusting just one 
source of information begins to feel unsecure and therefore investors can’t trust the information 
given to them by an advisor of one bank.  
Similar rationale could explain the result that those respondents who find it hard to 
understand the information given by financial institutions about the way their mortgages work 
and the risks involved trust less likely in investment advisors than those finding it easy. 
However Table 5 reports no statistically significant marginal effect for this variable and 
therefore it can’t be concluded that there actually is a connection between this variable and the 
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probability to trust. As discussed in the previous section having a mortgage doesn’t effect on 
the probability of trusting investment advisors. This result supports that conclusion. I would 
argue that with a different kind of a question layout asking whether respondent finds it hard to 
understand the information given by financial institutions, it would result in different outcome 
leaving the specification on mortgage out. After all avoiding investment mistakes is one of the 
key reasons behind utilizing financial advisory (Fischer, Jansen, and Hackethal, 2008). If the 
customer doesn’t understand the advice he is unable to utilize it and subject to mistakes.  
The findings of Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) state that trust in professional advice 
affects the market participation when perceived own financial capability is low. Extending this 
statement it could be argued that people finding it hard to understand information given by 
financial institutions perceive that their own financial capability is low. Therefore if they’re 
unable to trust the investment advisors they will not participate in the market. Hence it would 
be crucial for the banks to gain their trust to even be able to sell them the products profiting the 
bank. This leads to the conclusion that banks should invest time and money to clarify their 
massage to understandable form for all customers in order to gain their trust and make profits 
on them.  
People thinking that changing banks is hard are 2,0 percentage points less likely to trust 
in investment advisory than those finding it easy. This result is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level and supports the hypothesis. Those finding it hard to change banks are prone 
to believing they are stuck with their relationship with the current bank. Therefore the bank in 
question probably can charge any rate of fees from these customers which eventually drives the 
customer to not trusting their advice. As Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) argue the more 
trusted the professional giving the advice is the more the bank can charge fees from the 
customer. Another consequence from feeling hard to change banks is that the customer is 
trapped with the same advice given from the bank on how to invest. If this advice doesn’t fit 
the customer the trust in the advice is bound to drop. Also it is possible that people finding it 
hard to change banks are skeptical about acquiring information on their own about different 
possibilities. These people are likely to be skeptical towards the advice they’re given by 
financial institutions as they believe that changing banks and reaching for different options 
would only result in high amount of time-consuming bureaucracy. Blaming the banks of these 
difficulties and bureaucracy results in negative feelings towards advice.  
Certain financial priorities can be concluded to have an effect on trusting financial 
advisors. Table 5 reports statistically significant results at 5% significance level for four 
financial priorities. People saving for retirement trust 2,8 percentage points more likely in 
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investment advisors than those not prioritizing retirement. This could be explained by the fact 
that planning for retirement is a long term project and requires regular saving. Therefore people 
could be more prone to turning to investment advisor for help designing an investment plan. It 
could be that people are not willing to jeopardize their retirement savings by investing 
themselves as retirement plans often carry significant amounts of money. Similar explanations 
could account for the result that people prioritizing passing on money to their children and 
grand-children trust 2,7 percentage points more likely in investment advisors than those not 
prioritizing this. In addition to knowledge on investment possibilities passing on money 
requires also knowledge on legal matters. There are several laws regulating passing on money 
and therefore acquiring a professional’s advice is sensible especially when considering giving 
large amounts of money. These sort of plans are often for the long term and therefore it could 
be that people are more prone to turning to advisors to reduce the anxiety of investing. 
Supporting the evidence of Model 8 people prioritizing saving for protecting their family 
in case of illness or inability to work trust 2,8 percentage points more likely in investment 
advisory than those not prioritizing this. Similarly people saving for emergencies trust 3,1 
percentage points more likely in investment advisory than those not preparing for emergencies. 
It can be argued that everyone should save for emergencies and the data shows that 48,6% of 
the respondents prioritized this (Appendix 1). However those especially needing to save for 
emergencies are disadvantaged people. For example people with low wage could be in trouble 
in case of a surprising expense such as interest rates increase. When the wage isn’t enough to 
cover these surprising expenses there should be a savings plan which assists in times of trouble. 
These people have often low level of financial literacy and therefore they are more willing to 
trust investment advisors (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, 2015). Table 5 doesn’t report 
statistically significant results for the effects of other financial priorities. However these results 
lead to rejecting the hypotheses in Table 1 assuming that no financial priority effects the 
probability of trusting investment advisors.  
Table 5 reports that respondents finding thinking about their finances and financial 
services as interesting trust 2,8 percentage points more likely in investment advisors than those 
disagreeing with them. If the respondent feels comfortable thinking about his own finances, he 
is 4,6 percentage points more likely to trust in advisors on average. The results are statistically 
significant at 5% significance level. Another statistically significant result is that respondents 
finding thinking about their finances and financial services depressing trust investment advisors 
6,2 percentage points less likely than those disagreeing with them. These are the only 
statistically significant results from variables measuring sentiment towards thinking about 
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financial services and respondents’ own finances. Therefore it isn’t possible to state clearly 
whether negative sentiment results in trusting less likely in investment advisory and positive 
sentiment results in trusting more likely. Hence if believing the statement of Georgarakos and 
Inderst (2011) that people who don’t trust the advice given by financial institutions don’t either 
utilize it, it would lead to the conclusion that people who find thinking about their finances 
depressing actually utilize less likely the advice. Thus they would be subject to repeating their 
investment mistakes and feeling even more depressed thinking about their finances. This would 
result in a circle of negative feelings and decreasing probability of trusting in financial advice.  
Those feeling comfortable or interested when thinking about their own finances and 
financial services are probably in a good financial situation and feel confident thinking about 
the future. These people are easier for the advisors to deal with as there is no negative feelings 
involved. A positive baseline for the discussion leads to more trusting environment and 
therefore the mutual trust increases. Thinking about finances and financial services depressing 
leads to a negative baseline confronting an investment advisor and makes it difficult for the 
advisor to turn the sentiment around. Feeling depressed about one’s own finances could be due 
to previous losses or just poorly handled finances and disappointments. This type of a customer 
has a strong opinion already coming to the negotiation. With a limited time frame and plenty to 
discuss it gives the investment advisor little room to convince the customer and build trust in a 
hostile environment. This results to customer not trusting the investment advisor and just 
feeling even more depressed thinking about the next encounter. Turning this type of a cycle 
around would require a strong intervention from the investment advisor in question. However 
as investment advisors have tight performance targets, investing much of their time for just one 
customer isn’t possible. Therefore the cycle of feeling depressed about thinking one’s own 
finances and financial services is hard to break.  
The finding of Bhattacharya et al. (2012) of people being most unwilling to obtain 
financial advice when they most need it supports the result of depressed feelings leading to 
lower probability to trust. Those who have encountered losses previously and feeling depressed 
thinking about their finances are in the greatest need of the advice as they have the biggest risk 
of irrational investing in the hopes of superior profits. Fischer, Jansen, and Hackethal (2008) 
conclude that one of the key reasons to utilize advisory is to avoid investment mistakes. Those 
feeling depressed thinking about their finances are prone to mistakes and therefore should 
consult a professional when making investment decisions. Feeling depressed is a result of 
wrong kind of an investment strategy. For example too risky investment strategy can lead to 
panicking when the market drops. When the investor panics he makes rash decisions and 
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probably cashes his investments.  Therefore he encounters unnecessary losses. If he discussed 
with an investment advisor at the time of the market drop he could even have the confidence in 
investing more in that product. This strategy would lower his average buying price and therefore 
he would gain profits on the investment sooner when the market recovers. Hence it is an 
important part of the discussion to agree on the appropriate risk level for the investment 
strategy. This ensures the customer knows the risks involved and approves them. This kind of 
discussion with an investment advisor could be a solution to avoiding depressed feelings 
towards one’s own finances.  
The binary logistic regression model presented in Table 5 reveals that people who have 
used the Internet to make bank transactions are 2,2 percentage points less likely to trust in 
investment advisors than those not familiar with this possibility. The result is statistically 
significant at 5% significance level and confirms the hypothesis that the users of Internet utilize 
the information available there or at least critically evaluate the advice they’re given. The 
reference group here is the respondents not utilizing the Internet to make bank transactions. 
These people are on average elderly people with less knowledge on information technology. 
Therefore they have less information available and fewer possibilities to compare different 
options such as the products they’re offered by investment advisors. These people could also 
have had a long relationship with their bank and the investment advisor and therefore the mutual 
trust has been built over the years.  
As Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) reasoned there has to be other benefits apart from pure 
returns that investors are seeking from advisors. Taking the explanation of Gennaioli, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2015) that investors are too anxious to invest on their own and therefore seeking 
the advice of financial institutions would fit the result arguing that those using the Internet are 
less likely to trust in investment advisors. People not comfortable using the Internet as a tool 
are therefore more willing to pay fees for financial institutions’ advice. They can’t reach the 
same information online or are unwilling to make the final investment decisions on their own. 
Therefore they turn to investment advisors and are willing to pay higher fees for their products 
compared to passive investing strategies not offered by traditional banks.  
On average people who could consider obtaining stocks abroad trust 7,0 percentage points 
less likely in investment advisors than those who wouldn’t consider. As a statistically 
significant result this leads to the conclusion that those considering stocks abroad have a higher 
level of financial literacy as international investors and are prone to questioning the advice 
investment advisors give. These people are more likely to make the decision on their own as 
they already have experience investing. This group of respondents are not afraid of the 
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challenges related to investing abroad such as currency risk or they are willing to hedge those 
risks. This would suggest that they are probably suffering from overconfidence as well. 
Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) argue that investors utilizing advisory services are too 
anxious to invest on their own since they have low level of financial literacy. Advisors are able 
to ease their mind and therefore investors don’t care about the costs occurring. This support my 
findings as investors with international portfolios and high level of financial literacy trust less 
likely in investment advisors than those not willing to invest abroad. Investors not willing to 
even consider investing abroad are clearly suffering from home bias. Fama and French (2007) 
suggest that investors could have tastes for assets which would explain for example home bias.  
The final model explaining trust in investment advisors finds that thinking that having a 
bank account is expensive doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on the probability to 
trust. Therefore cost sensitiveness can’t explain differences in the probability of trusting 
investment advisors. However the model finds that people who think that the marketing 
techniques of financial institutions are aggressive trust 1,6 percentage points less likely in 
investment advisors than those not finding them aggressive. The result is statistically significant 
at 5% significance level. Supporting the hypothesis the result shows that too aggressive 
marketing from banks doesn’t increase sales but might even result in loss of customers when 
their trust decreases. When customers can’t trust that the advice they’re given is genuine and 
not a result of an aggressive marketing campaign or a sales competition they’re bound to be 
resentful towards the products advisors try to sell. As Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) argue in 
their paper, customers don’t utilize the advice they’re given if they don’t trust it.  Trust issues 
between advisors and customers are a serious problem for a bank as investment advisors are the 
voice of the bank and in direct relationship with the customers. Investment advisors are an 
important part of banks’ salesforce. When customer doesn’t trust in investment advisor it is 
likely that he can’t trust the bank either as the advisor is the representative of the bank. 
Therefore banks have to balance between no visibility in the media (which could lead to 
customer loss) and too aggressive marketing (which can also result to customers leaving the 
bank after loss of trust).  
As the competition becomes more intense the banks are forced to take a proactive manner 
of approach towards customers. Advisors don’t have enough customers if they don’t proactively 
invite them for meetings. However this approach has a down side of customers perceiving the 
marketing too aggressive which leads to loss of trust. When the competition increases banks 
are forced to market their products and services. However as the banks are perceived as 
objective institutions aggressive marketing compromises this image. Therefore banks are in a 
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difficult position. We’re on the verge of a new era of banking where new practices have to be 
implemented to survive the global competition and increasing share of online banking.  
Respondents finding the information they get from financial institutions clear and 
understandable are 13,5 percentage points more likely to trust in investment advisors than those 
not finding it clear. This statistically significant result shows how important it is for the banks 
and for the advisors to deliver clearly their message and marketing. When customer receives 
inadequate or confusing information he can’t make an investment decision and the work of the 
advisor gets harder. It’s vital for the advisor to deliver the message considering the background 
and level of financial literacy of the customer. When talking to a kindergarten teacher and her 
husband the plumber it isn’t relevant to use any finance jargon since they’re not able to 
understand the meaning of the terms and only get confused. When the audience of the advisor 
is of lover financial literacy he should be able to explain all the relevant factors in an easily 
understandable manner and cut the unnecessary jargon. The advisor has to be able to relate to 
the customer and talk in similar language to gain the trust.  
Carlin (2009) argues that banks add complexity to their pricing structures to prevent the 
customers from understanding them. However my findings don’t support the rationale to 
increase complexity as if the information isn’t clear the customers lose their trust. This would 
result in losing the customers. According to French (2008) financial institutions deliberately 
fail to correct some assumptions. Hence it could be argued that even though a customer would 
get clear and understandable information from financial institutions it isn’t necessarily correct 
information or it is likely to be biased to serve the purposes of the bank.  
People who find financial transactions generally secure are 9,7 percentage points more 
likely to trust in investment advisor than those believing transactions to be unsecure. The result 
is statistically significant at 5% significance level and comes as no surprise. This result is truly 
intuitive. If a person doesn’t trust the bank transactions to be secure it would be irrational to 
trust in the investment advisor who makes the transactions. Doubting the bank as a whole 
reflects on the relationship towards investment advisors as this result reveals. People trusting 
the bank transactions to be secure also trust the bank as a mediator and therefore share the 
quality of trusting more likely in investment advisors on average.  
People who think that the confidential information they give to banks or insurance 
companies is adequately protected trust 13,2 percentage points more likely in investment 
advisors than those disagreeing them. As a statistically significant result this confirms the 
observation that people trusting the bank as a whole trust more likely also in investment 
advisors. Those doubting the actions of the bank are more prone to believing that the investment 
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advisors are neither worth the trust. If a customer feels that the information he gives 
confidentially to the investment advisor leaks to his colleagues or other parties he can’t trust 
the advisor. Especially if he feels that the bank can’t keep his information protected why would 
he trust the investment advisor to differ? Confidentiality is a key question to banks as it is 
defined by law. Leaking customer information is considered severe offence against the law and 
banking practice. Therefore protecting the information of customers is an important part of 
banking institution.  
The binary logistic regression model presented in Table 5 doesn’t find a statistically 
significant connection between trusting investment advisors and those thinking that when 
making a transaction on the Internet, it is harder to sort out any problems that may arise. 
Therefore there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that people agreeing with this statement 
would rather discuss the issues with an investment advisor face-to-face and therefore trust 
advisors more than those disagreeing with the statement. However it could be that people 
finding it harder to sort out problems when the transaction is made online do business rather 
with an investment advisor. This study just concludes that those people don’t trust statistically 
significantly more in advisors than people not finding the problems harder to sort out when 
transactions are made online.  
The last variables of Model 9 represent the country dummies in reference to Belgium. 
These dummies serve as control variables. Therefore to illustrate the actual variation in the 
probability of trusting investment advisors between countries Graph 1 presents the results as a 
histogram. Graph 1 reports the probability of trusting investment advisors by country from 
Eurobarometer 60.2 and interpersonal trust in others by European Values Study 2002. 
Eurobarometer 60.2 reports that people in Greece are clearly the least likely to trust in 
investment advisors followed by Italians and Portuguese. Only 19,8% of respondents from 
Greece reported that they trust in investment advisors. Graph 1 reports that Finns trust the most 
in investment advisors. 73% of respondents in Finland reported that they trust in investment 
advisory. Close second are the Danish with 71,4% trusting investment advisors. They are 
followed by Austria where 65,1% of respondents trust in advisors. If not looking at the 
“outliers” meaning the countries with the highest and the lowest probability to trust, Graph 1 
reports quite solid 50% probability of trusting investment advisors across EU. 
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Graph 1 
Trust by country 
The graph presents the percentage of respondents who report trusting investment advisors in Eurobarometer 60.2 
and those reporting that most people can be trusted in European Values Study. Presented are the unrefined statistics 
from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey reported in descriptive statistics in Appendix 1. The data is from 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and from European Values Study 2002.  
 
These results reporting the probability of trusting by country can be argued to be effected 
by the general level of trust in others in each country. Therefore Graph 1 presents trust index 
from European Values Study 2002 to demonstrate the level of trust in others by country. 
Unfortunately this study lacks data from Portugal. These values of trust are not directly 
comparable to each other as the respondents from European Value Study are asked whether 
most people can be trusted combined with question of should one always be careful to trust. 
However Graph 1 presents the trends of trusting in others from European Values Study which 
serves the purpose of this research.  
Graph 1 reports the highest trust index for Denmark followed by Sweden. Close are also 
the Netherlands and Finland. Lowest level of trust in others is reported from Greece. Clear 
differences in the level of trust are revealed from Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and 
Austria which all report above 20 percentage point difference in the level of trust between these 
studies. However as the studies are not directly comparable interpreting these differences must 
be done with caution. The trends of trust are similar in both studies showing low level of trust 
in South Europe and high level of trust in North Europe. Zak and Knack (2001) study a growth 
model where heterogeneous agents transact and face a moral hazard problem. They argue that 
cheating is more likely by brokers and therefore trust is lower among investors when formal 
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institutions are weak, social sanctions from cheating are ineffective and the investors’ wage is 
low. These factors could explain the low trust in Southern Europe. In Southern Europe the 
society is emphasizing different priorities than in Northern Europe such as the meaning of 
family. It can be argued that the formal institutions do not play as significant role in there as 
they do in Northern Europe. The culture is different in terms of social sanctions from cheating 
or lying. Also the wages are lower in Southern Europe than in the North. Transparency 
International ranks countries by the level of corruption. Finland, Sweden and Denmark are all 
in top four least corrupted countries in the world. Greece, Italy and Spain rank below 35. Hence 
level of corruption can be argued to have an effect on the probability of trusting investment 
advisors. Also the financial situation of the countries can have an effect on the general level of 
trust towards the financial institutions.  
Graph 1 shows that South Europeans’ trust in investment advisors is depressingly low. If 
believing the findings of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) that households’ trust in others 
has a statistically significant effect on stock market participation this result would suggest that 
market participation in the Southern Europe is lower than in for example in Scandinavia. And 
if combined with the conclusion by Merton and Bodie (2005) that economic growth is promoted 
by well-functioning financial institutions I would argue that this is one issue Southern Europe 
should address when striving towards growth. When people don’t trust the investment advisors 
the financial institutions can’t work properly because of lack of funding. If people don’t buy 
the products investment advisors sell, the banks won’t have money to lend out. This prevents 
the whole economy from functioning. Trust is a vital part of economy working the way it should 
since there is a real threat of the economy freezing and stagnating when there is a lack of trust. 
Addressing this issue would help in boosting the economy in Southern Europe.  
8. Subsample analysis 
This section presents subsample analysis based on the results discussed previously. Here 
are discussed the most interesting effects found in previous models explaining trust in 
investment advisors which differ in subsamples. This section reveals remarkable country 
differences as the final model averages the results to EU level. However as this section shows 
there are a number of effects that differ quite substantially between countries. Therefore a 
deeper analysis is needed to understand these effects. Appendix 4 reports the subsample logistic 
regression models done by country. Subsample analysis is done for all the statistically 
significant effects reported in the final model presented in Table 5 and few other interesting 
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variables. Appendices 4, 5 and 6 report the results in detail and this section discusses the most 
relevant findings.  
8.1. Subsample analysis by country 
Graph 2 presents gender differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors by 
country. As discussed previously men tend to trust less likely in investment advisors and Graph 
2 reports the percentage point differences between men’s and women’s probabilities to trust by 
country. Both results are reported, the unrefined percentage point differences from 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and the differences found in country specific logistic regression 
models. The graph reports positive values when men trust less likely in investment advisors. 
This is to avoid most values falling below the axis. 
Graph 2 
Differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between women and men 
The graph presents the percentage point differences between women’s and men’s probability of trusting investment 
advisors. Two results are reported: the first column states the unrefined percentage point differences from the 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and the second column presents subsample logistic regression models’ marginal effects 
of male dummy reported in detail in Appendix 4. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is 
administered by the European Commission. The values are positive when men trust less likely in investment 
advisors than women. The differences are converted this way to positive to avoid most values falling below the 
axis. A star marking following country name signifies that the result from subsample logistic regression model is 
statistically significant at 5% significance level. Two stars signify statistically significant result at 1% significance 
level.  
 
Graph 2 shows remarkable variations between countries in the gender differences in 
probabilities of trusting investment advisors. The largest difference in likelihood of trusting is 
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reported from Sweden. A statistically significant result at 5% significance level from subsample 
logistic regression model is that in Sweden women trust 10,9 percentage points more likely in 
investment advisors than men. A large statistically significant positive difference in 
probabilities for the benefit of women occurs also in Denmark, France and Finland. However 
these differences between men’s and women’s likelihood of trusting investment advisors 
indicate women trusting more likely as previously discussed. On the other hand Graph 2 reveals 
that in Portugal men actually trust more likely in investment advisors than women with 4,5 
percentage points difference. However this difference is not statistically significant and similar 
results are not found with a logistic regression model. Also Germany, Greece and United 
Kingdom report men trusting more likely in advisory than women but the differences are less 
than a percentage point and not statistically significant in logistic regressions. Graph 2 suggests 
that countries with high probability of trusting investment advisors in general (as reported in 
Graph 1) also carry high differences in probabilities between genders. Extending the argument 
by Lundeberg, Fox and Puncochar (1994) that men are more overconfident than women, these 
results could indicate more overconfident men in countries having high probability of trusting 
in general. Finland and Denmark are the two countries with highest probability of trusting 
investment advisors as reported in Graph 1 and they have high trust index values in European 
Values Study for trusting other people. These graphs report that the difference in probabilities 
of men’s and women’s trust in investment advisors is emphasized when the likelihood of 
trusting in general is high. When people’s likelihood of trusting is low the difference diminishes 
or even reverses.  
If believing Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) that trust is effected by the possibility 
of being cheated, it could be that as women are more risk averse than men (Barsky et al., 1997; 
Eckel and Grossman, 2008: Croson and Gneezy, 2009) their probability of trusting is therefore 
lower in countries with higher probability of being cheated. In countries where the investor 
protection is high women are more willing to trust in financial institutions and investment 
advisors. This effect could explain the reverse difference in probabilities of trusting between 
genders. When the investor protection is in place other factors begin to effect the difference 
between men’s and women’s probability of trusting such as overconfidence.  
An interesting finding presented in Graph 3 is that even though at EU level there is no 
difference between probabilities of people owning stocks and those not owning stocks in 
trusting investment advisors, there are significant differences found in some countries. Graph 3 
presents the percentage point difference in likelihood of trusting investment advisors between 
people owning stocks and those who don’t own stocks. Positive values indicate stock owners 
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trusting more likely in investment advisors than those not owning stocks. The graph is plotted 
this way to avoid most observations lining below the axis. Graph 3 reports the differences in 
probability of trusting as unrefined descriptive statistics and the results of subsample logistic 
regression models presented in Appendix 4.  
Graph 3 
Differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between stock owners and those not 
owning stocks 
The graph presents the percentage point differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between stock 
owners and those not owning stocks. Two results are reported: the first column states the unrefined percentage 
point differences from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and the second column presents subsample logistic 
regression models’ marginal effects of stock owner dummy reported in detail in Appendix 4. The data is from 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered by the European Commission. The values are positive when 
stock owners trust more likely in investment advisors than those not owning stocks. A star marking following 
country name signifies that the result from subsample logistic regression model is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. Two stars signify statistically significant result at 1% significance level.  
 
The largest difference in probability is reported from Portugal where stock owners trust 
32,0 percentage points more likely in investment advisors than those not owning stocks. A 
subsample logistic regression model indicates that the statistically significant difference in the 
probability is 23,9 percentage points. A remarkable finding is that 71,9% of stock owners 
reported to trust in investment advisors in Portugal. More than 10 percentage point difference 
in likelihood of trusting is reported also from Greece, Italy, Spain, France and Ireland. Therefore 
the hypothesis that stock owners would trust less likely on average in investment advisors in 
every country is not supported by these findings. However logistic regression models on 
country subsamples reveal that only France and Portugal have a statistically significant 
difference in likelihood of trusting at 5% significance level between the two groups. Both of 
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these differences are interestingly positive and therefore conflicting with the hypothesis that 
people owning stocks would have high level of financial literacy and therefore exercise more 
critique against investment advisors.  
However similarly to the final model explaining trust in investment advisors presented in 
section 7, Graph 3 finds no significant differences in probability of trusting between people 
owning or not owning stocks for most of the countries. However these findings suggest that 
this effect is not uniform across EU. There are many possible explanations for these findings. 
France and Portugal reporting a significant difference in probabilities both have low trust in 
general (Graph 1). In Southern Europe the culture is different and could have its own effect on 
trusting financial institutions and the population who believes them to be trustworthy. It could 
be that the minority holding stocks have bought them in consequence of advisory or they are 
working themselves in a bank. The findings could be explained by the fact that there are a 
minority of stocks owners in these countries and therefore only limited amount of observations 
(Appendix 1). Hence this effect would require further studying with larger dataset from these 
countries.  
Another remarkable finding is that especially in Southern Europe people who reported to 
have made bank transactions over the Internet actually trusted more likely in investment 
advisors than those who had not made similar transactions. Graph 4 presents both figures: the 
unrefined differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors by country between those 
who have made bank transactions over the Internet and those who haven’t and the results of 
subsample logistic regression models. 
Graph 4 reports a statistically significant positive 20,8 percentage point difference in the 
likelihood of trusting investment advisors in Greece between people making bank transactions 
over the Internet and those not making. The graph reports that in Greece those who have made 
bank transactions over the Internet trust more likely in investment advisors than those who have 
not made such transactions. The data shows that in Greece 58,3% of those who have made bank 
transactions over the Internet trust in investment advisors. Thus this is a substantial share of the 
group of people who trust in investment advisors in Greece. Other countries report smaller 
differences in probabilities of trusting and none of them are statistically significant. The three 
other countries reporting above 10 percentage point difference in likelihood of trusting are Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. These are also the countries which hold the smallest probability of trusting 
investment advisors in general (Graph 1). These findings suggest that the population trusting 
investment advisors in Greece is familiar with using the Internet which could be considered as 
a proxy for financial literacy at least in the beginning of 2000’s. Findings represented in Graph 
46 
 
3 and Graph 4 both indicate that people with high level of financial literacy actually trust more 
likely in investment advisors in southern parts of the Europe. However these results must be 
interpreted with caution as most of the differences are not statistically significant at 5% 
significance level.  
Graph 4 
Differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between those who have made bank 
transaction over the Internet and those who have not 
The graph presents the percentage point differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between those 
who have made bank transactions over the Internet and those who have not. Two results are reported: the first 
column states the unrefined percentage point differences from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and the second 
column presents subsample logistic regression models’ marginal effects of variable v136banktransactions reported 
in detail in Appendix 4. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered by the European 
Commission. When the values are positive those who have made bank transactions over the Internet trust more 
likely in investment advisors than those who have not made such transactions. A star marking following country 
name signifies that the result from subsample logistic regression model is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. Two stars signify statistically significant result at 1% significance level.  
 
People who think the marketing techniques of financial institutions are aggressive trust 
less likely in investment advisors as discussed previously. However studying this effect closer 
Graph 5 reveals that the effect is conflicting in Greece and in Portugal. There people finding 
the marketing of financial institutions aggressive trust more likely in investment advisors than 
those not finding the marketing aggressive. Statistically significant at 5% significance level the 
negative difference is in Greece. These results support the previous findings that in Southern 
Europe the factors affecting trusting investment advisors are different or at least somewhat 
conflicting to other parts of Europe. This could be caused by differentiations in culture and 
possibility of being cheated (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008). In Southern Europe it could 
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be considered as a character of a well-known and trusted bank that it markets its products widely 
and somewhat aggressively. Aggressive marketing can be therefore seen as a positive quality 
of a bank. Hence banks not marketing their products are seen as suspicious trying to hide 
something. These differences are also cultural. In Northern Europe banks are seen as reliable 
and somewhat objective institutions and hence aggressive marketing is seen as a negative 
outcome which decreases their trustworthiness.  
Graph 5 
Differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between those finding the marketing 
techniques of financial institutions aggressive and those not finding them aggressive 
The graph presents the percentage point differences in probability of trusting investment advisors between those 
who think that the marketing techniques of financial institutions are aggressive and those not finding them 
aggressive. Two results are reported: the first column states the unrefined percentage point differences from the 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and the second column presents subsample logistic regression models’ marginal effects 
of variable v199aggressivemarketing reported in detail in Appendix 4. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey 
which is administered by the European Commission. The values are positive when those who think that the 
marketing techniques are aggressive trust less likely in investment advisors. The differences are converted this 
way to positive to avoid most values falling below the axis. A star marking following country name signifies that 
the result from subsample logistic regression model is statistically significant at 5% significance level. Two stars 
signify statistically significant result at 1% significance level.  
 
The largest positive differences in the likelihood of trusting investment advisors Graph 5 
reports from Sweden, Finland and Luxembourg, between those agreeing that the marketing 
techniques of financial institutions are aggressive and those disagreeing them. These 
differences in the likelihood of trusting are statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
However the differences in probabilities between the two groups do not tell about the 
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probability of trusting investment advisors. Therefore to clarify this Graph 6 presents the 
probabilities of trusting by country for both groups.  
Graph 6 
The probability to trust in investment advisors among those finding the marketing techniques of 
financial institutions aggressive and those not finding them aggressive 
The graph presents the percentage of respondents who report trusting investment advisors of those who think that 
the marketing techniques of financial institutions are aggressive and those not finding them aggressive. Presented 
are the unrefined probabilities to trust from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 
survey which is administered by the European Commission. The light column presents the respondents trusting 
investment advisors as a percentage of those respondents who reported to agree that the marketing techniques of 
financial institutions are aggressive. The dark column presents the probability to trust among respondents who 
disagreed with the statement.  
 
Graph 6 shows that even though there is a statistically significant 9,1 percentage point 
difference in Finland in the likelihood of trusting investment advisors between people finding 
the marketing aggressive and those disagreeing with them, the probability of trusting is high 
overall. 65,2% of those who believe that the marketing techniques of financial institutions are 
aggressive report however trusting investment advisory in Finland. In Sweden there is a 12,8 
percentage points statistically significant difference in probabilities of trusting between the two 
groups and 12,6 percentage points difference in Luxembourg. However in both of these 
countries still almost 50% of people finding the marketing aggressive report trusting in 
investment advisors. In comparison in Italy about 32% of both groups trusted investment 
advisors in Eurobarometer 60.2 survey as the level of trust in general is low.  
Graph 7 presents the differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors by 
country between respondents who agreed that the confidential information they give to banks 
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and insurance companies is adequately protected and those who disagreed. The graph presents 
both the unrefined differences in probabilities of trusting from Eurobarometer 60.2 and the 
results of subsample logistic regression models. The results show the large effect reported 
already previously in Table 5 of confidentiality playing a large role in trusting investment 
advisors. All countries except Greece and Italy have statistically significant positive differences 
at 5% significance level between those finding their information adequately protected and those 
disagreeing with them. In most countries the differences are statistically significant even at 1% 
significance level which stresses the effect.  
Graph 7 
Differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between those thinking that the 
confidential information they give to financial institutions is adequately protected and those finding 
the confidentiality violated 
The graph presents the percentage point differences in probability of trusting investment advisors between those 
thinking that the confidential information they give to financial institutions is adequately protected and those 
finding the confidentiality violated. Two results are reported: the first column states the unrefined percentage point 
differences from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and the second column presents subsample logistic regression 
models’ marginal effects of variable v204confidentiality reported in detail in Appendix 4. The data is from 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered by the European Commission. The values are positive when 
those who think that the confidential information is adequately protected trust more likely in investment advisors. 
A star marking following country name signifies that the result from subsample logistic regression model is 
statistically significant at 5% significance level. Two stars signify statistically significant result at 1% significance 
level. 
 
However to compare these results to the overall probability of trusting investment 
advisors reported from each country Graph 8 presents probability of trusting by country for 
stock owners and those not owning stocks. In Finland and in Denmark more than 75% of people 
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believing that the information given to banks is adequately protected report trusting investment 
advisors. On the other hand in Greece only 14,9% of people not believing the banks to protect 
adequately the information given trust in advisors. These results stress the importance of banks 
protecting the information of their customers and holding bank secrecy. The results reveal the 
inevitable connection between trusting a bank as a whole and trusting their investment advisors.  
Graph 8 
The probability to trust in investment advisors among those thinking that the confidential information 
they give to financial institutions is adequately protected and those finding the confidentiality violated 
The graph presents the percentage of respondents who report trusting investment advisors of those who think that 
the information they give to financial institutions is adequately protected and those disagreeing them. Presented 
are the unrefined probabilities to trust from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 
survey which is administered by the European Commission. The light column presents the respondents trusting 
investment advisors as a percentage of those respondents who reported to agree that the confidential information 
is adequately protected. The dark column presents the percentage of those trusting among respondents who 
disagreed with the statement. 
 
Next graph deepens the analysis of the feeling of security affecting trusting investment 
advisors. Graph 9 presents the differences in likelihood of trusting investment advisors by 
country between those who agree that financial transactions are generally secure and for those 
disagreeing. The graph reports both the unrefined differences in probabilities from descriptive 
statistics reported in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 and results of subsample logistic regression 
models reported in Appendix 4. All countries except Spain and Luxembourg report statistically 
significant differences in likelihood of trust. The graph reveals the large differences in 
probabilities of trusting between the two groups of respondents. In Ireland those finding bank 
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 t
o
 t
ru
st
Confidential information is adequately protected
Confidential information is not adequately protected
51 
 
transactions generally secure trust 15,3 percentage points more likely in investment advisors 
than those finding transactions unsecure. Portugal reports the second largest difference of 14,5 
percentage points in probabilities of trusting between the two groups. Comparing these results 
to the overall probabilities of trusting advisors between the two groups helps to understand the 
perspective. Hence Graph 10 presents both groups’ likelihood of trusting investment advisors 
by country. 
Graph 9 
Differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between those agreeing that financial 
transactions are generally secure and those disagreeing with them 
The graph presents the percentage point differences in probability of trusting investment advisors between those 
who agree that financial transactions are generally secure and those disagreeing with them. Two results are 
reported: the first column states the unrefined percentage point differences from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey 
and the second column presents subsample logistic regression models’ marginal effects on variable v203secure 
reported in detail in Appendix 4. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered by the 
European Commission. The values are positive when those who agree that the transactions are secure trust more 
likely in investment advisors. A star marking following country name signifies that the result from subsample 
logistic regression model is statistically significant at 5% significance level. Two stars signify statistically 
significant result at 1% significance level.  
 
Graph 10 shows that in Greece 36,9% of respondents agreeing that financial transactions 
are secure in general trust in investment advisors. This enlightens partly what effects the low 
level of trust in Greece as if the entire population was convinced that financial transactions were 
secure in nature, the level of trust in investment advisors would rise. Notable is that above 50% 
of respondents finding bank transactions generally unsecure in Denmark, Finland and Austria 
still report trusting investment advisors. Graph 10 supports the argument that finding bank 
transactions secure and accounting the possibility of being cheated low contributes to trusting 
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investment advisors. This strengthens the message for banks to operate reliably and keeping to 
bank secrecy.  
Graph 10 
The probability to trust in investment advisors among those agreeing that financial transactions are 
generally secure and those disagreeing with them 
The graph presents the percentage of respondents who report trusting investment advisors of those who agree that 
the financial transactions are generally secure and those disagreeing them. Presented are the unrefined probabilities 
to trust from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered 
by the European Commission. The light column presents the respondents trusting investment advisors as a 
percentage of those respondents who reported to agree that the transactions are secure by nature. The dark column 
presents the percentage of those trusting among respondents who disagreed with the statement. 
 
Another remarkable finding of subsample logistic regression models is that even though 
the general difference in probability of trusting investment advisors between those finding 
changing banks easy and those finding it hard is only about two percentage points there are 
significantly larger differences in some countries. Hence Graph 11 presents these differences 
by country as unrefined differences in probabilities from descriptive statistics and results from 
the subsample logistic regression models. Graph 11 reports positive values when those thinking 
that changing banks is hard trust less likely in investment advisors. The values are converted to 
positive to avoid most values falling below the axis. 
Four countries report statistically significant results at 5% significance level in subsample 
logistic regression models. These countries are Denmark, Spain, Ireland and Finland and all of 
them have above 7,5 percentage points differences in probabilities of trusting investment 
advisors between the two groups. The largest difference is reported from Ireland where those 
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finding changing banks hard trust 10,27 percentage points less likely in investment advisors 
than those finding it easy. Therefore even though at EU level the difference in probabilities of 
trusting between these two groups is low, there are some deviating countries found.  
Graph 11 
Differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between those agreeing that changing 
banks is hard and those who disagree with them 
The graph presents the percentage point differences in probability of trusting investment advisors between those 
who think that changing banks is hard and those who disagree with them. Two results are reported: the first column 
states the unrefined percentage point differences from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey and the second column 
presents subsample logistic regression models’ marginal effects of variable v193changingbanksishard reported in 
detail in Appendix 4. The data is from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered by the European 
Commission. The values are positive when those who think that changing is hard trust less likely in investment 
advisors than those who find it easy. The differences are converted this way to positive to avoid most values falling 
below the axis. A star marking following country name signifies that the result from subsample logistic regression 
model is statistically significant at 5% significance level. Two stars signify statistically significant result at 1% 
significance level. 
 
Subsample analysis by country reveals a few other notable statistically significant 
differences in probabilities of trusting investment advisors between countries. People 
prioritizing saving for retirement trust above 10 percentage points more likely in investment 
advisors than those not prioritizing this in Spain and in France. However conflicting result is 
that in Ireland people saving for retirement trust 9,9 percentage points less likely in investment 
advisors than those not prioritizing retirement. Another conflicting pare of results is that people 
finding thinking about their finances and financial services enjoyable trust 13,6 percentage 
points more likely in investment advisors in Portugal than those not finding it enjoyable. On 
the other hand in France this difference is -12,9 percentage points indicating those enjoying 
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their finances trusting less likely in advisory than those not finding thinking about finances 
enjoyable. These sort of conflicting differences in likelihood of trust lead to averaging of the 
EU level differences and therefore some statistically insignificant results at EU level can be 
statistically significant at country level. Appendix 4 reports in detail the subsample logistic 
regression models by country.  
8.2. Subsample analysis on other factors 
Subsample analysis by country results in the most interesting findings as presented above. 
However few noteworthy findings are revealed from other subsample logistic regression 
analyses as well. Appendix 5 and Appendix 6 provide the entire results of these subsample 
logistic regression analyses and this section covers the most essential discoveries.  
When taking a subsample of men and excluding women from a logistic regression model 
explaining trust in investment advisors, this reveals that men who find thinking about their 
finances and financial services enjoyable trust 4,2 percentage points less likely in advisors than 
those not finding their finances enjoyable. This statistically significant result at 5% significance 
level conflicts with the idea that positive sentiment would result in increased probability to trust 
as discussed previously. It seems that men who find their finances enjoyable are less likely to 
trust in advisory which could be caused for example by overconfidence. As discussed in section 
7 men are more overconfident on average (Lundeberg, Fox and Puncochar, 1994). Therefore 
those finding their finances enjoyable could be suffering from excessive overconfidence 
thinking that as they are in good terms with their finances they don’t need any advice.  
A logistic regression analysis on a subsample of those thinking that the information they 
get from financial institutions is clear an understandable finds that inside this subsample those 
who could consider obtaining stocks abroad trust a remarkable 14,1 percentage points less likely 
in investment advisors than those not willing to consider investing abroad. The result is 
statistically significant even at 1% significance level. Also two other subsample logistic 
regression models result in clearly larger difference is probability to trust in investment advisors 
between those who could consider obtaining stocks abroad and those who couldn’t than 
presented in Table 5. These subsamples consist of those who have not made bank transactions 
over the Internet (13,3 percentage points difference) and those who think that comparing the 
information from banks, about bank account features and charges isn’t hard (10,2 percentage 
points difference in probability). These subsamples present strong differences in probabilities 
to trust for this explanatory variable which could be explained by arguing that these people have 
high level of financial literacy and therefore they find information clear and easy to compare. 
55 
 
These people have also made bank transactions and know finance theory. Hence they’re willing 
to invest globally. The difference in probability to trust in investment advisors is emphasized 
in these groups because these subsamples include more people with high level of financial 
literacy.  
Interesting deviations from the final model explaining trust in investment advisors 
presented in Table 5 are found taking a subsample of those who could consider obtaining stocks 
abroad. Logistic regression model explaining trust in this subsample results that people finding 
thinking about their finances and financial services intimidating trust 23,8 percentage points 
less likely in investment advisors than those not finding it intimidating. This statistically 
significant result at 5% significance level strengthens the idea that negative sentiments towards 
one’s finances result in decreased probability to trust advisors. Another notable finding from 
this subsample is that those having a mortgage trust 16,7 percentage points more likely in 
investment advisors than those not having a mortgage. This result is statistically significant and 
it could be explained by these people being young adults who are open to global possibilities 
in their investing strategies but have little previous experience investing and therefore trust 
more likely in professionals’ advice. As Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) argue insecure 
investors need reassurance to provide them with a peace of mind. A logistic regression analysis 
on this subsample of people willing to consider global investing results in two conflicting 
effects. People who have made bank transactions over the Internet trust 27,2 percentage points 
more likely in advisory than people who have not made such transactions. This alone is 
conflicting result to previously discussed and reported in Table 5. Also this logistic regression 
model reveals that people who have made other transactions trust 20,3 percentage points less 
likely in investment advisors than those who have not made other transactions. Both of these 
results are statistically significant at 5% significance level and conflict the previous discussion. 
However interpreting these results must be done with caution as this subsample covers only 
1,6% of respondents in Eurobarometer 60.2. Therefore to generalize these results a larger 
dataset would be required.  
Similar conflicting results are found from a subsample logistic regression model covering 
people who find thinking about their finances and financial services depressing. However this 
model concludes that people who have made bank transactions over the Internet trust 7,6 
percentage points less likely in investment advisors than those who have not made such 
transactions. This effect is significantly larger than presented in the final model in Table 5. The 
conflicting part is that this model suggests that people who have made other transactions over 
the Internet trust 9,1 percentage points more likely in advisory than those who have not made 
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other transactions. The effect is statistically significant at 5% significance level but interpreting 
is difficult as “other transactions” is not well defined.  
Making a subsample of those who have made bank transactions over the Internet reveals 
a couple of interesting effects. Inside this subsample men trust 6,3 percentage points less likely 
in investment advisors than women. This result is statistically significant and reports clearly 
larger effect than found in Model 9 in Table 5. Another clearly larger effect found in this 
subsample is that people finding thinking about their finances and financial services comforting 
trust 6,4 percentage points more likely in advisory than those not finding it comforting. On the 
other hand people finding it enjoyable trust 7,9 percentage points less likely in investment 
advisors than those disagreeing with them. Also people finding the marketing techniques of 
financial institutions aggressive trust 6,7 percentage points less likely in advisory than those not 
finding them aggressive. This statistically significant effect is remarkably larger than reported 
in Table 5. However this is rather small subsample and therefore these results would require 
further testing with a larger dataset.  
Subsample logistic regression analysis reveals that not all of the effects reported in the 
final model explaining trust in section 7 are uniform. To conduct a detailed subsample study on 
these conflicting effects would however require a significantly larger amount of data. These 
findings shows that the factors affecting the probability of trusting investment advisors are 
many and even this European wide dataset doesn’t cover all the factors that could have an effect 
on trust. Thus next section presents implications of the results and topics for further study. 
9. Implications and suggestions for further study 
After the financial crisis in 2008 there has been vivid discussion on who should be blamed 
for the investors’ decisions especially during times of risk materializing. The crisis provoked 
the revision of MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) to strengthen the protection 
of investors and to make financial markets more transparent. The regulation of financial 
institutions has increased significantly during the 2000’s which has affected the work of 
investment advisors. Banks are more cautious giving advice to customers and even refusing to 
give advice on certain issues. When estimating outcomes emphasize is put on the uncertainty 
of predicting. This produces both positive and negative effects.  
From investment advisors perspective it is harder to give advice as the regulation limits 
the daily work. The bureaucracy limits the time he has for convincing a customer and deal 
closure. Having to fill out an investor profile and interviewing customer about various concerns 
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consumes valuable time and investors’ nerves. Processing the paperwork takes time and there 
is less time available for advisors to meet customers. Therefore banks have to employ more 
advisors and their costs increase which increases the customers’ fees. From the customers 
perspective increasing regulation provides investor protection. Advisors have to inform the 
investor about the costs and risks involved in products under discussion. Before selling anything 
advisors have to be convinced that the customer understands what he is buying and accepts the 
risks. However as the advisor has to emphasize the risks misleading can occur especially when 
the investor is already cautious. When emphasizing the risks they might seem unbearable for 
the investor even though the possibility of a risk materializing would be minimal. This leads to 
for example elderly people saving to a bank account and missing the benefits of long term 
investing. This is a negative outcome for both the investor missing potential profits and the 
bank missing fees. Negative outcome can provoke decrease in trusting investment advisors.  
It would of interest to compare trusting investment advisors before the MiFID and 
afterwards as the intention of the regulation was to increase investor protection. This study 
doesn’t conclude whether people actually began to feel more secure and perceive the possibility 
of being cheated lower after the directive. If the regulation has not effected trusting investment 
advisors it should be critically evaluated whether increasing bureaucracy then profited anyone.  
Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) argue that people don’t utilize advice given to them if 
they don’t trust it. Concluding that 50,7% of citizens of EU trust in investment advisors can the 
banks really be blamed for the investors’ poor decisions? If almost half of the people don’t trust 
the advice given to them following the argument of Georgarakos and Inderst they also don’t 
utilize it. This would lead to the conclusion that in about 50% of cases investors make their 
investment decisions without the advice of financial institutions. It could be that banks and their 
advisors are to blame for some part of financial crisis in 2008 and giving irresponsible advice. 
These results however show that banks can’t be blamed for every poor investment. I would 
argue that heavy regulation is not the answer especially in personal banking where customers 
are households and bureaucracy only complicates matters.  
Global competition and low interest rates in EU have led to banks marketing their 
products and services more aggressively. Due to the low interest rates banks are forced to device 
other ways to earn profits than lending out at higher rate than paying for the deposits. These 
actions are harmful for the customers’ trust. Online banking is spreading to advisory services 
as well with online meetings offered to customers at more convenient times of day than before. 
Further studying is needed to conclude whether trusting investment advisors is effected by the 
channel of meeting. It could be that trust towards the advice is lower when the meeting is held 
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online and advisor not met by person. This channel makes the advice less personal and easier 
to ignore. When the documents are sent online it is easier for the customer to back out and deal 
closure becomes more difficult for the advisors. When profits are low banks are forced to close 
offices especially in areas of dispersed settlement. This affects the sentiment towards banks and 
can have an effect on trusting advice. When the nearest office with investment advisors is two 
hundred kilometers away it is no surprise that one can begin to feel depressed when thinking 
about financial services.  
Unfortunately Eurobarometer 60.2 lacks data of several interesting factors that could have 
an effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. For example the data doesn’t make 
a difference between traditional banks and brokerages. I would argue that there is a difference 
in the probability of trusting investment advice of large well established bank and a brokerage 
offering investment products at huge margins. At least people should be more careful to trust 
in the advice of a brokerage since their advisors are paid by provision and the products are 
significantly more expensive than in a traditional bank. When advisors are paid by the results 
they make they have an incentive to sell products with high fees even if the product wouldn’t 
fit the customer profile. These brokerages also market their services aggressively which is 
concluded to lower the likelihood of trusting investment advisory. Thus for example in Finland 
I would assume that people are more likely to trust in the investment advisors of Nordea Bank, 
a well-established traditional bank than Aleksandria, the brokerage. Similarly it could be that 
the banks’ size effects the likelihood of trusting their advice. A well-known large bank could 
benefit at smaller banks’ detriment since they are able to provide a feeling of security and 
professionalism.  
Another factor that could have an effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors 
is income level of the customer. Income level can be considered as a proxy for financial literacy 
and thus higher income level should lead to lower likelihood of trusting advisory. Similarly 
respondents’ education could indicate the level of financial literacy. These matters are left for 
further studying.  
It would be interesting to study the probabilities of trusting investment advisors through 
time but unfortunately Eurobarometer doesn’t offer this possibility as the question of trusting 
in financial advice has not been asked again. Therefore studying people’s trusting patterns and 
how they have evolved over time would require making of a European wide survey and 
gathering the data. Also country comparisons around the world would be of interest. Probably 
for example Americans tend to trust less likely in investment advisors than Europeans as the 
general level of trusting in others is lower. Another improvement in studying trust in investment 
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advisors would be to examine data describing the level of trust. The trust variable in this study 
is binary with no possibility to examine individuals’ level of trust. Hence acquiring data with a 
possibility to answer for example on a scale from one to five how much one trusts in investment 
advisors would add to the findings of this study.  
Some of the variables from Eurobarometer 60.2 survey suffered from collinearity and 
therefore they were excluded from this study. For example variable consisting of those 
expecting financial institutions to give advice suffered collinearity to those trusting investment 
advisors. To avoid biased results this study excludes all variables suffering collinearity. 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey covers more than 16 000 respondents’ information and therefore is 
a comprehensive dataset. However some of the questions could have social desirability bias. 
For example reporting that it is hard to compare information from banks, about bank account 
features and charges might be resentful for some and they rather report that it’s fairly easy. 
However as the questionnaire is comprehensive and has a variety of other topics included I 
would argue this survey holds little social desirability bias. Respondents are not effected by 
their answers and therefore gain nothing answering against their true habits.  
The characteristics of the investment advisor probably also effect whether the customer 
trusts the advice or not. This shouldn’t distort the results of this study as the question is framed 
“I usually trust the advice given by financial institutions”. However some banks have personal 
advisors targeted for each customer hence the customer only gets advice from this one person. 
I would argue that advisor’s professionalism, assertiveness and charisma have an effect on 
whether the customer believes and trusts the advice. The ability to convince the customer is key 
to gaining trustworthiness.  
Also other personal characteristics of the customers not investigated in this study could 
effect on the probability of trusting investment advisors. These characteristics can be 
determined for example by culture. For example Finns are proud by nature and not used to 
asking for advice from others. The mentality is more striving to survive without help rather than 
admitting to not coping and understanding everything. When in southern parts of Europe the 
mentality is quite the opposite. These characteristics could have an effect on especially men’s 
likelihood of trusting investment advisors as men tend to be more overconfident (Lundeberg, 
Fox and Puncochar, 1994). Culture has an effect on the general level of trust in others which 
impacts trusting advisors. When people are raised to be cautious to trust anyone this is bound 
to influence the likelihood of trusting advisors.  
Another factor possibly affecting the probability of trusting is the history of profits gained 
in consequence of advisory. Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) argue that investors are 
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taking on more risk as the trust increases and therefore are gaining higher expected returns. If 
indeed the customer is able to gain higher profits he is probably more likely to return for the 
advice and trust it even more. However if the advice leads to poor returns the customer can 
begin to feel depressed when thinking about he’s finances and as concluded this would result 
in decreasing probability to trust. Hence I disagree with Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny on their 
argument that banks offer advisory only to gain fees on customers. If banks would only extract 
fees customers would eventually seek for more profitable options on investing. Therefore it is 
in banks’ best interest to offer good customer service to keep the clients and retain a trustworthy 
image.  
How could a bank then influence the likelihood of customers trusting their advice? A key 
takeaway is that educating customers to comparing information about banks, bank account 
features and charges would increase the likelihood of trusting in their advice. When the 
customer feels that the advisor in giving genuine advice on which options would benefit him 
and educating him about the options, he is more willing to trust the advisor. Aggressive 
marketing doesn’t work in favor of trusting investment advice except in Greece and possibly in 
Portugal. Banks should invest time and money to giving clear and understandable information 
for all customers. Emphasizing confidentiality and security of transactions would increase the 
likelihood of trusting investment advisors. Also agreeing on the appropriate level of risk for the 
investment strategy is vital to avoid panicking with volatile products. If the volatility of the 
strategy is too high investor is likely to cash out when the value of the investment is decreasing 
which leads to negative feelings towards advisory.  
10. Conclusion 
Previous literature has lacked results of studying what factors affect trusting investment 
advisors. Therefore this research asks the question who trusts investment advisors and why. 
This constitutes a whole new area of study and novel results on understanding investment 
advisory. I find that men trust on average 3,9 percentage points less likely in investment 
advisors than women and that there are significant country differences in the probability to trust. 
South Europeans trust less likely in advisory than North Europeans and the factors affecting the 
trust are differing between countries. Those finding it hard to compare information or change 
banks trust less likely in investment advisors than respondents finding those easy. People 
finding thinking about their finances and financial services comforting are 3,1 percentage points 
more likely to trust in advisory than those not feeling the same way. Depressed feelings result 
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decreased likelihood of trusting. The results support the notion of Gennaioli, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2015) that financial literacy affects trusting advice. Those who have made bank 
transactions over the Internet are more likely to trust in investment advisors than those not 
familiar with the procedure. Similarly investors who would be willing to consider obtaining 
stocks abroad are less likely to trust in advisory than those only investing in their home 
countries. Aggressive marketing by the financial institutions decrease the likelihood of trusting 
in their advice. Giving clear and understandable information and keeping confidential 
information adequately protected increases the probability of trusting. Overall 50,7% of 
Europeans trust in investment advisors.  
The largest effects this study finds influencing people’s trust in investment advisors are 
whether one finds the information given by financial institutions clear and understandable and 
whether the respondent feels his confidential information adequately protected. Hence the main 
issues banks can act on to influence the probability of trusting in their advice is to stress the 
importance of confidentiality and clarity of information. Bank secrecy is essential part of 
banking practice and therefore probably every bank strives towards keeping their customer 
information highly protected. This study reveals the concrete remarkable effects of violating 
this confidentiality.  
Trust issues between advisors and customers should be taken seriously by the banks as 
the advisors are the representatives of the banks. Advisors are the channel for selling banks’ 
products to customers and when the products are no selling, the bank is not making earnings. 
This relationship has become increasingly important as the interest rates are historically low in 
Euro countries. Banks are not therefore able to profit as previously from mortgage loans and 
fees on investment products have begun to play an increasing role in banks’ earnings. Hence 
the importance of investment advisors has increased. To gain customers’ trust the advisor 
should be able to give clear and understandable information no matter the level of financial 
literacy of the customer. Therefore cutting the unnecessary jargon and relating to the customer 
is crucial. Educating customer about options benefitting him, makes the customer feel the 
advisor is giving genuine advice.  
According to Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) investors don’t consider the fees 
related to products bought from advisors as costs since the professional is able to provide them 
a peace of mind in investing. Therefore investors venture taking more risk and earn higher 
expected returns than they would investing on their own. The results of this study support these 
arguments as more than half of the respondents are willing to trust the advice given by financial 
institutions ignoring Jensen’s (1968) arguments promoting passive investment strategies. The 
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willingness to obtain advice could be the result of difficulties retail investors face with large 
product selection and allocation choices (Goldstein, Johnson and Sharpe, 2008). French (2008) 
suggests that banks and the press promote the illusion of active investing being easy and 
profitable. Hence investors could be trapped believing to gain superior profits with active 
investing strategies.  
Even though finance theory and evidence supports passive investing the fact is that it’s 
not easily accessible to average households. Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) note that 
it’s not in the interests of banks to advice people to invest in passive strategies. Therefore to 
keep profiting from customers, banks advice retail customers to invest in their products. Even 
though this seems unmoral practice I agree with Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny that retail 
customers earn higher expected returns investing with the help of a professional. As investing 
in passive strategies would require high level of financial literacy I suspect that an average retail 
investor is better off trusting financial advisors. Although the products are more expensive at 
least the investor is participating in the market and not missing out entirely the potential profits 
by keeping his money on an account. The reality is that not all retail investors possess the time 
and energy to use their free time learning finance theory. Since comprehensive schools have 
disturbingly little financial education and not all go to business schools, most people have rather 
low level of financial literacy and understanding of finance theory. Hence investing on their 
own they probably experience unnecessary losses. Even finding information on passive 
investing requires time and knowledge on where to look. Therefore I conclude that trusting 
investment advisors would be rational for most retail investors.  
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Appendix 3 
The percentages of respondents reporting to trust in investment advisors among age groups 
The graph presents the percentages of respondents who report trusting in investment advisors among their age 
group. Presented are the unrefined statistics from the Eurobarometer 60.2 survey. The data is from 
Eurobarometer 60.2 survey which is administered by the European Commission.  
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